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HONG KONG'S ENDGAME AND THE RULE OF
LAW (I): THE STRUGGLE OVER INSTITUTIONS AND
VALUES IN THE TRANSITION TO CHINESE RULE
JACQUES DELISLE* AND KEViN P. LANE*
1. INTRODUCTION
The fifteen-year struggle over Hong Kong's future has been a
struggle over the rule of law. The People's Republic of China
("P.R.C.") and Great Britain agreed at the outset of negotiations
over the territory's future to strive to preserve Hong Kong's
"stability and prosperity," a task that was seen to depend on
preserving the rule of law. Specifically, this meant pledging to
maintain the territory's common law legal system and most of its
existing laws while also undertaking to construct judicial, law-
making, and law-administering institutions adequate to implement
a "high degree of autonomy" for the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region ("S.A.R."). In addition, much of the work and
many of the conflicts in the preparations for Hong Kong's
transition and the establishment of the S.A.R., from the drafting
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong
Kong1 ("Joint Declaration") and the Basic Law for the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region2 ("Basic Law"), to the
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disputes over late colonial amendments to Hong Kong ordinances,
to the enactment of national and local legislation establishing
S.A.R. government organs, have centered on law and legal
documents. For the British colonial authorities, the P.R.C., rising
political leaders in Hong Kong, and the residents of Hong Kong,
much of the discourse over what seem clearly to be political,
economic, and social issues has focused on questions about laws,
law-making and law-interpreting institutions, and the rule of law.
This "legal" focus has remained as Hong Kong's protracted
transition has entered its "endgame."3  In the final years and
months leading up to the formal handback of Hong Kong, the
focus, however, has turned increasingly to two seemingly disparate
yet closely related issues. First, the impending deadline for the
territory's reversion to Chinese rule has forced all participants in
the politics of Hong Kong's transition to address specific laws and
institutions for the S.A.R., which will be the nuts and bolts of a
functioning legal system, government, and constitutional order for
Hong Kong beyond July 1, 1997. In particular, conflicts over a
Bill of Rights Ordinance, a Court of Final Appeal ("C.F.A.") bill,
the status of the Legislative Council ("Legco") and a successor
Provisional Legislature, and the process for selecting the S.A.R.'s
first Chief Executive, have been central controversies in transition-
al Hong Kong's endgame. Second, the approach of the reversion
date has generated an intense political competition over what
notions of law and legality will prevail among groups that seem
essential to Hong Kong's continued prosperity and stability.
Here, the sharpest and most sustained conflicts have concerned the
rule-of-law values and related attitudes toward concrete legal and
institutional controversies that "the Hong Kong people" and the
territory's business elite do in fact hold or could be persuaded to
adopt.
1520 [hereinafter Basic Law].
' The term "endgame" has taken on two quite different meanings, both of
which shed light on the battle over laws and institutions in contemporary
Hong Kong in ways that this Article and its sequel explain. In the rational
choice and game theory literature, "endgame" refers to the last round of a
reiterative game, when the (intra-game) reputational incentives to cooperate fall
away, increasing the likelihood of "defection" or "cheating," and, therefore, the
difficulty of ma ing any bargains (or at least any credible bargains). In a more
colloquial sense, the "endgame" refers to a final "push" in which participants
scramble to strike bargains against an impending deadline, with the result often
being an eleventh-hour "breakthrough" or a flurry of small deals.
[Vol. 18:1
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME
These questions of tangible institutions and diffuse values have
been the objects of a struggle between two coherent, although not
monolithic, camps that have adhered to competing visions of
sovereignty and law with respect to Hong Kong. On one side,
the P.R.C., together with its Hong Kong allies and surrogates,
have approached such issues primarily from a positivist perspec-
tive, with proceduralist standards of legitimacy for laws and vast
substantive discretion for the sovereign at the core of their
conception of "domestic law" for Hong Kong. On the other side,
a more loosely defined group of "liberals" or "democrats" among
Hong Kong's emergent politicians and its British colonial rulers
have been animated by a broadly natural law-influenced view of
Hong Kong's domestic legal order. This view accords a central
place to the notion that laws and the organs that make and apply
the law must comport with specific, substantive standards of what
justice demands of a sovereign.
In some respects, this fundamental clash of visions would
appear to leave little room for the complex and subtle struggles
over rule-of-law values and institutional detail that have been
unfolding in contemporary Hong Kong. As the debates centering
on the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law during the 1980s and
many of the political conflicts of the 1990s have shown, the main
protagonists in the drama of shaping Hong Kong's future judge
the validity of the legal and institutional arrangements for the
S.A.R. according to incommensurable and incompatible standards
that emphasize broad and categorical claims about the character
of legitimate authority. Each side has seemed determined to assert
the exclusive validity of its preferred standard. This polarized
conflict has continued to the eve of reversion. It has generated a
series of confrontations in which members of the two political
camps have made clear their sharply different understandings of
the key controversies of the era and their divergent litmus tests
for acceptable solutions to them. In a battle thus fought in terms
of what is non-negotiably "right" or non-derogably committed to
sovereign discretion, what position to take on particular proposed
laws or institutions for the S.A.R. would appear to be a matter
not open to ambiguity or conducive to ambivalence, and the
subjective attitudes of particular Hong Kong communities would
seem to be at best peripheral, if not entirely inadmissible,
concerns. That has not, however, been the case during the final
years of the struggle over the S.A.R.'s legal and institutional order.
1997]
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As the arrival of the endgame during the past several years
shifted the agenda to wrangling over concrete laws and law-related
institutions, and despite a sharpening of the basic ideological
clashes over the territory's post-1997 order, previously recessive
qualities of indeterminacy and flexibility also have come to the
fore in the visions of law and sovereignty of both sides. For the
P.R.C. side, these key questions of the era have been ones to
which its positivist perspective has offered no single answer.
Within the boundaries set by the minimal constraint that nothing
be allowed to compromise the P.R.C.'s ultimate sovereignty over
Hong Kong, there is a considerable variety of plausible answers to
the question of how much accommodation of liberal and legalist
views is prudent in the quest for specific legal rules and institu-
tional arrangements conducive to a smooth transition. Although
newly visible, such tactical flexibility is not new to (nor a
departure from) the perspective on law and sovereignty that the
P.R.C. and its allies have shared. One of the principal features of
a radically positivist conception of domestic law, after all, is the
sovereign's discretion to choose among a fairly wide range of laws
and institutions.
On the "liberal" or "democratic" side, the central concerns of
the era also have been ones to which a generally naturalist
perspective offers diverse and conflicting answers. Although the
basic vision clearly precludes actions and arrangements incompati-
ble with the fundamental demands of justice, it does not prescribe
legal or institutional details to a high level of specificity. Rather,
it leaves such matters to be shaped by local circumstance. A
general notion that sovereignty ought to be exercised through
accountable government institutions that undergird a rule of law,
for instance, necessarily leaves much room for interpreting
precisely what institutional forms or legal norms are adequate and
appropriate in a particular setting. With questions about such
"details" having risen high on the agenda, this always-present
"space" for different readings of what fixed but abstract principles
require simply becomes more relevant than it had been in earlier
phases of the process of shaping Hong Kong's post-1997 future.
With the focus thus shifted to issues with respect to which
adherents of either relevant conception of sovereignty and
domestic law might disagree among themselves or change their
positions over time, the connection to the endgame's second shift
of focus becomes clearer. In such a context of flexibility and
[Vol. 18:1
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indeterminacy, the rule-of-law values held by major social groups
can matter a great deal. For adherents to a basically "positivist"
perspective, they can affect the sovereign's policy preferences and
prudential calculations. For proponents of a broadly "naturalist"
vision, they may constitute key components of the local circum-
stances that can shade interpretations of the demands of justice.
The ideas that key Hong Kong communities hold thus emerge as
factors that will greatly determine where - and perhaps whether
- a politically and economically viable set of concrete legal and
institutional arrangements for the S.A.R. will fall within the range
of options that members of either side in the political clash of
visions could find acceptable in principle.
Moreover, the sustainability of any package of legal and
institutional arrangements that is acceptable to the P.R.C. and its
supporters, or the necessity of any package advanced by their
counterparts among the territory's emergent politicians and
colonial rulers, seems to depend on the support, or at least
acquiescence, of key groups in the territory after 1997. Put
simply, an answer to the central questions of the endgame that
failed to win acceptance among the ordinary citizenry of Hong
Kong, "the Hong Kong people," could jeopardize the territory's
political stability, which is itself a precondition to prosperity. An
answer to those legal and institutional questions that failed to
comport with the views and values of the territory's business
community would be hazardous for Hong Kong's prosperity,
which is a linchpin of the territory's political stability. An
answer that offered something that neither group wanted or
needed would be especially likely to fail.
Accordingly, during the last several years of Hong Kong's
transition, participants in the ongoing political struggle over the
territory's future order worked to claim and to create support
among "the people" and business elites in Hong Kong for rule-of-
law attitudes that they found relatively appealing, or that were at
least minimally acceptable under their broad visions of law and
sovereignty. Section 2 of this Article considers those "visions."
It sketches the fundamentally conflicting conceptions of the nature
and basis of domestic law for the Hong Kong S.A.R. that the
principal parties to the political struggle over Hong Kong's post-
1997 order have held throughout the process of negotiating the
terms of Hong Kong's reversion. Section 3 examines in more
detail how the clash of basic perspectives has unfolded in the
1997]
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struggles over the specific legal and institutional issues that have
dominated the agenda in the years after the adoption of the Basic
Law. It explains how the positions that key participants staked
out on such issues as the Bill of Rights Ordinance, the legislature,
the Court of Final Appeal, and the chief executive selection
methods fit within either of the two opposed visions, one shared
by the P.R.C. and its supporters in Hong Kong and another by
their frequent antagonists of a generally liberal or democratic
bent.
Section 4 then turns to an assessment of the other side of the
apparent paradox of the era. It points to the exposure, of
significant room for choice and disagreement over specific legal
and institutional prescriptions within the confines of either
overarching vision. Section 4 then explains how the rising
salience of issues that revealed or permitted such flexibility
combined with changes in Hong Kong politics to produce a
greater concern with the rule-of-law-related values and attitudes
held by vital segments of Hong Kong society. Section 4 then
briefly summarizes the strategies that the parties to the political
struggles over the shape of S.A.R. laws and institutions deployed
in their efforts to elicit and enlist support from the ordinary
citizenry and business elites in Hong Kong. (A more detailed
analysis of the political battles over the attitudes of "the people"
and "the business community" toward the rule of law and the
specific legal and institutional issues of the 1990s is undertaken in
a separate article which will appear in a subsequent issue of this
Journal.)
Section 5 of this Article suggests how different concepts of an
"endgame" might help to explain the seemingly odd coexistence
of the appeals to principle and interest in the battles over the
allegiance of social groups, the emergence of clearer splits and
shifts in specific legal and institutional prescriptions advocated by
adherents to either vision of law and sovereignty, and the
persistence - even escalation - of the clash between visions.
Section 5 also suggests how those battles, splits and shifts may
manifest "endgame strategies," in some rather different senses of
that term, pursued by adherents to the two visions of sovereignty
and domestic law that are, at once, polar opposites and capacious
enough to permit the finding of some common ground on some
concrete issues.
[Vol. 18:1
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2. Two VISIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DOMESTIc LAW FOR
HONG KONG
In some respects, there has been a remarkable consensus about
the legal and related institutional order for a Chinese-ruled Hong
Kong. All participants in the protracted process of shaping Hong
Kong's future appear to have accepted the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law as the documents that set the fundamental frame-
work defining that order, with the Basic Law implementing and
making specific the general undertakings set forth in the Joint
Declaration. All sides also appear to have agreed that establishing
the legal underpinnings for the S.A.R. legislature and its top court,
and selecting its first chief executive, constituted much of the
essential work of the terminal colonial phase. There also seems
to have been general recognition that the Bill of Rights question
and related issues of the reception of colonial law into S.A.R. law
were among the other major items at the top of that agenda.
More diffusely, the various participants all saw settlement of such
issues as essential to guaranteeing Hong Kong a "rule of law" that
would help sustain stability and prosperity.
Still, the two principal groups that were engaged in the
political process of addressing these questions divided profoundly
on how they should be answered. This division created an
ongoing conflict that in some respects has sharpened during the
endgame, and that has been, throughout the transitional period,
rooted in a clash between radically different notions of what
makes any particular legal and institutional arrangement for the
S.A.R. either potentially legitimate or unacceptable even in
principle.
2.1. The PR.C. and "Pro-PR. C." Vision: Sovereign Discretion and
Procedural Legitimacy
In addressing the S.A.R.'s internal legal and institutional order,
the P.R.C. has consistently taken the position that the rules for
how Hong Kong's post-1997 laws will be made - as well as some
of the laws themselves and the authority of the institutions that
make, interpret, and apply those laws - are matters for the
P.R.C. alone to determine, through proper exercises of its
sovereign legislative power. In making laws, establishing and
defining legal and political institutions, and determining the
19971
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permissible modes of exercising legal and political authority in
Hong Kong, the P.R.C. enjoys the plenary authority of the
positivist sovereign fully empowered to act within its domestic
realm.
The P.R.C. is free to decide specific content of Hong Kong
laws, including what rights of citizens they will offer and protect,
how nearly they will approach socialist ideals, how much they
will look like legislation in effect elsewhere in the People's
Republic, and how far they will depart from the laws on the
books in Hong Kong at the end of the era of British rule. The
P.R.C. may make these decisions without regard to what the
residents of Hong Kong or the British (or anyone else) claim to
be the demands of substantive justice, human rights, the requisites
of good government, or even the traditions or established practices
of Hong Kong's economy and society. The same latitude for
choice surrounds the decisions about how autonomous the Special
Administrative Region should be, what powers its legislature, chief
executive, and courts shall enjoy, and the procedures through
which such organs may act and by which their office-holders are
to be selected.4
Thus, any number of legal and institutional arrangements
could be adopted via the Basic Law or other domestic Chinese
legislation assigning the exercise of legal and governmental
authority in the Hong Kong S.A.R. No principle forbids or
requires the Basic Law or other domestic Chinese statutes to
delegate substantial law-making, administrative, or adjudicative
authority to the S.A.R. government or to mandate that Hong
4 One of the most formal indications of this position is China's careful
casting of its statements about the status of the arrangements it has accepted for
Hon Kong's future order in the Basic Law. A piece of domestic P.R.C.
legislation, the Basic Law declares that China "has decided" ['ueding] to establish
the S.A.R., and that it is the P.R.C.'s National People's Congress that
"authorizes" [shouquan] the S.A.R. to exercise autonomy and enjoy various
powers under the Basic Law. See id. pmbl., art. 2. At various points during
the transition, official Chinese sources have asserted that the Chinese
government alone, and not the colonial government, has the authority to speak
or the Hong Kong people. See, e.g., Philip Bowring & Emily Lau, Turning Up
the Heat, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Feb. 14, 1991, at 24. More generally, the
Chinese official position has long been that Hong Kong has always been subject
to Chinese sovereignty. This position is reflected in the statement in the Joint
Declaration that China "has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong." See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 1.
[Vol. 18:1
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Kong's distinctive "systems" remain unchanged.'
More concretely, the Basic Law is to be the constitutive
document for the future Hong Kong S.A.R., the source of
authority for its legislative, executive, and judicial organs, and the
touchstone of validity for its specific laws. The Basic Law itself
is a discretionary and proper exercise of the P.R.C.'s sovereign
legislative authority by the P.R.C.'s National People's Congress
(N.P.C.") and thus would be no less valid if it had substantially
different content. Hong Kong laws predating the establishment
of the S.A.R. can be valid after June 30, 1997, but only if they are
either incorporated by the provisions of the Basic Law, adopted
pursuant to the Basic Law's provisions conferring law-making
authority, or enacted in the same general manner as the Basic
Law. 6
As this brief statement of the Basic Law's status and function
suggests, the P.R.C.'s vision of domestic law for Hong Kong does
not demand discretion for the Chinese sovereign to be so
completely unconstrained so as to preclude elements commonly
thought necessary for a distinctively legal or law-governed order.
Even within the P.R.C.'s rather radically positivist perspective, the
force of substantive laws and of organic laws for government
institutions depends upon their having been duly enacted by
institutions with sufficient formal powers and according to proper
legal and constitutional procedures.
Such a proceduralist understanding of the domestic exercise of
sovereignty existed throughout the P.R.C.'s handling of questions
about Hong Kong's future legal and institutional arrangements
even before the Basic Law was drafted. Article 31 of the current
(1982) Chinese Constitution carefully creates the legal basis for
establishing the S.A.R. The actions adopting the Basic Law and
, The Joint Declaration complicates this analysis somewhat. Under the
U.K.'s highly contractarian conception of the Joint Declaration-as-treaty, China
has undertaken a number of very constraining obligations that limit whatever
latitude it might otherwise have in legislating domestically for the S.A.R. For
China, under its expansive notion of non-derogable sovereignty at international
law, the constraining effect of such undertakings was much less clear. In any
event, whatever restrictions the Joint Declaration might impose on domestic
legislative discretion, they are, from either perspective, matters not of principle
but of the practice of bilateral negotiation or unilateral pronouncement. See
infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6 See generally Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 1-11, 18.
z See XiANFA [Constitution] art. 31 (P.R.C.).
1997]
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implementing legislation have been arranged to conform to
requirements of proper legislative or quasi-legislative process, and
have been cast as exercises of authority lawfully committed to the
issuing organs. Thus the Basic Law itself was duly enacted by the
N.P.C., in accordance with the requirements for national
legislation set forth in the state constitution, and as an exercise of
legislative authority granted to the N.P.C. by that constitution
The simultaneous decisions concerning the establishment of the
initial S.A.R. Legislature and selection of its first Chief Executive
were also offered by the N.P.C. as a proper exercise of its
legislative authority over a part of the P.R.C.9
Moreover, much of the text of the Basic Law itself is devoted
to defining the scope of authority and the operating procedures of
S.A.R. government institutions, and the relationship between the
S.A.R. government and the Central People's Government in
Beijing. 0 Such provisions, viewed from the P.R.C.'s perspective,
are specifications of the principle that local legislation, judicial
interpretations, and other legal rules in the S.A.R. must conform
to the processes and fall within the scope of delegated powers that
the P.R.C. has authorized in the Basic Law or in national
legislation applicable to Hong Kong.
Such minimal proceduralism, however, is still only one aspect
of the Chinese conception of the domestic legal enterprise in
Hong Kong. In the P.R.C.'s positivist vision, the preservation of
the P.R.C.'s substantive latitude in lawmaking remains a necessary
accompaniment to the emphasis on procedural legitimacy. No
allocation of authority or substantive commitment in domestic
law can be permitted to have the effect of irretrievably alienating
the Chinese sovereign's discretionary authority in ruling Hong
Kong. Put broadly, the P.R.C. cannot undertake lightly any
potentially runaway promises of S.A.R. autonomy. Put more
narrowly, because one aim of proceduralist legitimacy is to assure
8 See id. arts. 47, 58, 62; Basic Law, supra note 2, pmbl., art. 11 (citing
article 31 of the constitution).
" See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xianggang Tebie Xingzheng
Qu Diyi Ju Zhen u he Fabui Cbansbeng Ban a de Jueing [Decision of the
National People's Congrss on the Method for the Formation of the First Govern-
ment and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region] (1990), reprinted in Basic Law, supra note 2 [hereinafter NP.C. Deci-
sion].
10 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 12-23, 43-104, 158-59.
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and enhance the sovereign's capacity to make laws that reflect its
preferred policies, the P.R.C. cannot countenance binding or
irrevocable promises that empower Hong Kong to enact laws or
establish institutions that could undermine the P.R.C.'s Hong
Kong policies which, as "mere" policies, are potentially malleable.
Examples of the P.R.C.'s adherence to this principle of
domestic sovereignty in its approach to issues of S.A.R. laws and
institutions are legion. In crafting the S.A.R.'s legal order, the
P.R.C. has been careful to retain decisive authority in P.R.C.
institutions and P.R.C.-controlled processes. The P.R.C. constitu-
tional provision on special administrative regions preserves
flexibility about when and for how long such an entity is
established and what its special powers include." Under the
Basic Law, which some call Hong Kong's "mini-constitution,"
such vital functions as amending and interpreting the Basic Law,
directing judicial interpretation of some of its most sensitive
provisions, and appointing the executive-dominated S.A.R.
government's Chief Executive, are ultimately and formally left to
the N.P.C., its Standing Committee, or the Central People's
Government. 12 Because the Basic Law itself is a P.R.C. statute
enacted by the N.P.C., under Chinese constitutional theory it is
freely amendable by procedurally proper subsequent legislation.
The clause in the Basic Law barring amendments inconsistent with
the P.R.C.'s "established basic policies ... regarding Hong
Kong"13 is presumptively unable constitutionally to preclude
contrary subsequent legislative action. Paragraphs 1 and 3 and
Annex I of the Joint Declaration, which set forth the key initial
statement of those policies, are themselves cast as unilateral
Chinese pronouncements, avoiding as much as possible the air of
binding international legal commitment.
14
U See XIANFA art. 31.
2 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 158, 159, and annex I.
13 See id. art. 159.
1 The Joint Declaration states that China "has decided to resume the
exercise sovereignty over Hong Kong." Joint Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1
(emphasis added). Article 3 sets forth very general promises about Hong
Kong's future autonomy and order in text following a statement that the
P.R.C. "declares that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding
Hong Kong are as follows." Id. art. 3 (emphasis added). A more detai led
statement of those "basic policies" is consigned to Annex I, which is also cast
as a unilateral "elabor[ation] of the basic policies of the People's Republic of
China." Id. annex I.
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2.2. The British and Hong Kong Liberal-Democratic Vision:
Sovereign Obligation and Substantive Values
Hong Kong's colonial masters and its emergent group of
liberal and pro-democracy politicians have shared a perspective on
domestic law and government institutions for the S.A.R. that has
been profoundly at odds with that of the P.R.C. and its support-
ers in the territory. The Basic Law, domestic Hong Kong
legislation seeking to survive the transition to Chinese rule," the
powers and authority of the law-making and law-applying
institutions for the S.A.R., and post-1997 substantive laws for the
S.A.R. are, on this view, to be judged on the basis of their
conformity to norms of what just and good laws and government
institutions must be.
To varying degrees and at various times, many of Hong
Kong's most prominent politicians (outside the distinctly pro-
P.R.C. and "business conservative" camps), the territory's gover-
nor, and officials in London have defined those norms in basically
liberal, democratic, and legalist terms. This diverse group of
participants in the political struggles over Hong Kong's future
have seen the package of sovereign obligations as including at least
the reliable and neutral interpretation and enforcement of laws by
a professional and independent judiciary and civil service.
According to the publicly expressed views of colonial officials and
many Hong Kong leaders, the package must also include the
economic freedoms and many of the civil and political liberties
that Hong Kong residents have enjoyed in practice during the
closing years of British rule. In addition, something more is
necessary in the way of publicly accountable institutions that are
at least broadly democratic in spirit.
The perspective underlying this position has many of the
characteristics of a natural law understanding of sovereignty's
domestic face. The standards against which the S.A.R.'s domestic
laws and institutions are to be measured are ultimately fixed and
substantive. As the adherents to this view see it, these standards
are more than the transient or contingent values that the British
authorities or Hong Kong's new liberals and democrats happen to
hold dear and would like to foster; they are more permanent and
15 See id. annex I, art. HI; Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 160 (permitting the
"laws previo.usly in force in Hong Kong" to be adopted as laws or the S.A.R.).
[Vol. 18:1
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less malleable than mere political preference or social consensus.
Moreover, the proponents of this view have understood these
demands not primarily as reflecting the natural "rights" of Hong
Kong's citizens (although that argument has surfaced as well), but
rather as obligations that a sovereign owes to its subjects.
Nothing fundamental turns on the formal or procedural status of
arrangements that track or breach those obligations. Promises
about Hong Kong's laws and institutions that the P.R.C. has been
willing to accept and embody in the S.A.R.'s foundational
documents are seen as part of an inseverable bundle of principles,
including a number of additional ones that the P.R.C. has been
determined to reject. Conversely, the fact that a provision
inconsistent with a just and good legal and institutional order has
been enshrined in a statute or other instrument applicable to the
S.A.R. cannot save it from illegitimacy, and, by some lights,
invalidity.
Indications of the British authorities' affinity for this perspec-
tive can be found in several aspects of their handling of questions
of domestic legal and institutional arrangements for the S.A.R. At
the beginning of the Sino-British negotiations on the territory's
future, Prime Minister Thatcher announced that Britain had a
moral obligation and duty to the people of Hong Kong. Such a
duty at least implicitly extended beyond the point at which
Britain entered into a treaty to hand Hong Kong to the P.R.C.
and in some sense beyond the end of British administration of the
territory in 1997 - two watershed dates for the termination of
legal duties with respect to Hong Kong (first, that of presumptive-
ly permanent sovereign, and second, that of exerciser of sovereign
power and provider of laws and governance). 6
Moreover, Britain had backed the inclusion in the Joint
Declaration of a number of provisions protecting or promoting
liberal, legalist, and democratic values under post-1997 Hong Kong
law. That was at least part of the import of passages pledging the
continuation of Hong Kong's laws in force, as well as the
common law, judicial, social, and economic systems, the applica-
bility of the principal United Nations human rights covenants and
a list of specific liberal rights, and the constitution of future
16 Governor Patten made the point explicitly, stating that "Britain's moral
responsibility extends beyond June 30, 1997." The Long View, FAR E. ECON.
REV., May 30, 1996, at 17 (interview with Governor Patten).
19971
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
legislatures by election." In addition, British authorities in
London and in the colony later pressed for a substantial voice and
role in shaping the laws and institutions for post-reversion Hong
Kong, despite their formal exclusion from the centerpiece of that
process, the drafting of the Basic Law. In addition to supporting
a broadly liberal and democratic S.A.R. constitutional order, the
British authorities began to undertake compatible changes in areas
that remained under their control. They took modest steps
toward democratizing the territory's quasi-representative institu-
tions, with such moves beginning years before the endgame
gambits of Governor Patten's electoral reforms and the enactment
of the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 8
At the very least, such serious and varied efforts (as well as the
rhetoric of moral responsibility and duty) suggested a lack of
acceptance of the P.R.C.'s positivist vision of domestic sovereign-
ty. If, as the Chinese view sometimes seemed to claim, Hong
Kong's local laws were worth little more than the paper they were
printed on, to be revoked, amended or overridden freely by a
narrowly self-interested or fickle Central People's Government or
N.P.C., then there would have been little point to the British
concerning themselves with the substance of those laws at all.
For many of Hong Kong's emergent leaders and political
activists, there was a still-stronger affection for a viewpoint that
was broadly naturalist in spirit and liberal, democratic, and legalist
in substance. To the extent that the draft Joint Declaration
received a genuinely favorable reaction in politically aware
communities in Hong Kong, its promises of continuity in Hong
Kong's distinctive legal, social, and economic systems - which to
a significant degree embodied strong rule of law and liberal, if not
fully democratic, values - were the reason.19 And some of the
17 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3), (5), annex I § I-IH, XIII.
The Joint Declaration and its annexes are equally binding. See id. para. 8.
See generally James T.H. Tang & Frank Ching, The MacLehose-Youde
Years: Balancing the "Three-Legged Stool," 1971-86, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE:
HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1991 at 149, 160-64 (Ming
K. Chan ed., 1994); NORMAN MINERS, THE GOvERNMENT AND POLiTICs OF
HONG KONG 25-28, 36-37 (5th ed. 1995).
19 See Background to the Negotiations Preceding the Sino-British Joint
Declaration, reprinted in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 197, 200-02 (Hungdah
Chiu, Y.C. Jao & Yuanli Wu eds., 1987); Report of the Assessment Office on
Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability of the Draft Agreement on the Future
of the Territory, ch. 3, reprinted in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 212; The
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most serious doubts harbored in the territory about the Basic
Law, such as its reserving to the P.R.C.'s N.P.C. and its Standing
Committee the power to interpret and amend the Basic Law and,
in some circumstances, to legislate for the S.A.R., seem to have
been driven largely by the fear that such provisions would hinder
the continuation and growth of a liberal order with strong
rule-of-law norms."
Members of Hong Kong's emerging liberal and "pro-democra-
cy" political circles were adamant that Hong Kong's future laws
and institution were to be judged by their conformity to standards
that no government was at liberty to define or redefine. In
comparison to the views expressed by British officials, these Hong
Kong voices were more openly skeptical and worried that the
properly enacted laws and duly established institutions of the
future P.R.C.-run S.A.R. would fail to meet the relevant standards
of justice. 1
Even before the return to Chinese rule came to dominate
Hong Kong politics, the same general perspective had pervaded
local criticisms that some of Hong Kong's long-standing colonial
laws were unjust, regardless of their positivist validity. Most
visible in this area were, first, criticisms of laws that restricted
public meetings and political organizations, permitted film
censorship, chilled press freedom, and allowed corporal and capital
punishment, and, second, a critique of Britain's failure to take
steps to develop democratic government for the colony.2
Also well in advance of Hong Kong's reversion, the territory's
legal community, which was the source of so many of Hong
Future of Hong Kong: Statement Issued by the Unofficial Members of the Hong
Kong Executive and Legislative Councils on Nov. 29, 1984, reprinted in THE
FUTURE OF HONG KONG 220. See also IAN SCOTT, POLITICAL CHANGE AND
THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN HONG KONG 212-13 (1989).
20 See, e.g., Denis Chang, In Search of Pragmatic Solutions, in THE BASIC
LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 271 (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert H.Y.
Chen eds., 1988).
21 See, e.g., Martin C.M. Lee, A Tale of Two Articles, in THE BASIC LAW
AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE, supra note 20, at 309; Ming K. Chan, Democracy
Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making ofthe Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90, in THE
HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND PROSPERITY"
UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 3 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds.,
1991).
"' See, e.g., Li Tuet-wah, Freedom of the Media, in FROM COLONY TO
S.A.R.: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 457 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng & Sonny
S.H. Lo eds., 1995).
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Kong's liberal and pro-democracy politicians, had developed a
powerful belief that the rule of law is one of the most definitive
qualities of Hong Kong's system, and that its cultivation and
preservation are the ultimate explanation and guarantee of Hong
Kong's past and future success? The perceived connection has
been repeated so often and for so long that it has become a kind
of talisman not just for lawyers but also for public servants, and
for substantial segments of the territory's citizenry. The rule of
law that is seen as having such power and such potential, and as
being so gravely at risk even if the P.R.C. honors many of its
promises, is something profoundly different from the sparsely
procedural and substantively malleable one envisioned by a
P.R.C.-style positivist approach to domestic law for the Hong
Kong S.A.R.
3. CONFLICTING VISIONS AND THE LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF THE ENDGAME
The clash of fundamentally conflicting conceptions of domestic
sovereignty has continued, and indeed sharpened, as the endgame
has arrived, and the process of defining the territory's future order
has moved beyond the broad framework of the Basic Law to the
details of post-1997 laws and institutions. In each of the key
controversies of the era, the P.R.C. and its allies in Hong Kong
have insisted that the laws and legislative foundations of S.A.R.
institutions must accord protection for sovereign discretion and
satisfy proceduralist notions of legitimacy, ideas that are central to
the P.R.C.'s positivist perspective. With respect to the same
issues, Hong Kong's liberal and pro-democracy elements and, to
a significant degree, its colonial government have stuck just as
firmly to the notion that the laws and institutions of the S.A.R.
must meet demands of substantive justice, a position that is at the
heart of their loosely shared naturalist vision.
3.1. The Bill of Rights
In 1991, the Hong Kong government adopted a Bill of Rights
Ordinance and began a series of amendments to colonial laws that
had previously restricted civil and political liberties. The
I See, e.g., Martin C.M. Lee, Need for "Rule of Law", S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at 11.
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Ordinance was enacted largely in response to the Beijing leader-
ship's violent suppression of the 1989 Democracy Movement in
the P.R.C. and to what the suppression seemed to portend for
post-1997 Hong Kong. The Ordinance provided, among other
things, for rights to liberty and security of person; freedom of
thought, opinion, expression, association, and peaceful assembly;
participation in public life; equal protection under the law;
criminal due process; freedom from torture; and humane treat-
ment for people deprived of their liberty.24 The Ordinance also
decreed that inconsistent preexisting legislation was repealed and
that subsequent legislation was to be construed where "it admits
of such a construction . .. so as to be consistent" with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, key
provisions of which the Ordinance explicitly tracked.2 This
provision was further "entrenched" in Hong Kong law by a
simultaneous amendment to the Letters Patent, the British law
that serves as a principal part of Hong Kong's constitution.
Partly in response to the same sorts of political concerns and
pressures that prompted the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and also to
implement the broad promises of the Bill of Rights, the colonial
government undertook a number of eleventh-hour changes to laws
restricting peaceful political activities, including reforms to the
Public Order Ordinance (which had imposed license requirements
for public demonstrations) and the Societies Ordinance (which had
required government permission to establish political parties and
other associations and permitted restrictions on links to foreign
organizations).26
The P.R.C. and its allies in the territory rejected, primarily on
positivist grounds, any notion that the Bill of Rights and reforms
to specific legislation had any necessary impact beyond July 1,
1997. Some provisions might be allowed to survive, but they
2 See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, ch. 383, S 8 (1991). On the
political background of the Bill of Rights, see, for example, Emily Lau,
Confidence Building, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 26, 1989, at 19 (quoting Hong
Kong Attorney General Jeremy Mathews and the British Foreign Secretary).
' Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance S 4 (1991).
26 See Societies Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, ch. 151 (amended
1992); Public Order Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, ch. 245 (amended
1995). See generally, Diane Stormont, China Proposes Gutting HK Civil Liberties
Laws, Reuters, Jan. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File;
C.K. Lau, Harsh Provisions that Infringe on Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 25, 1994, at 18.
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would do so at the sufferance of the Chinese state and its
subordinate S.A.R. organs, the entities that would be the real
source of such laws' authority. It was, a prominent Chinese
spokesman on Hong Kong stressed, the N.P.C. Standing Commit-
tee that would declare which laws in Hong Kong should remain
in force after 1997.2 Objectionable provisions could be and
would be reversed by procedurally proper exercises of the P.R.C.'s
sovereign legislative authority over Hong Kong.2 Moreover, the
P.R.C. had already made clear through the Basic Law that the
rights referred to in the Bill of Rights would be protected under
S.A.R. law, thus making the Ordinance's substantive provisions at
best superfluous.29
Further, the P.R.C. and its allies warned that the significant
changes that the Hong Kong government had sought to make via
new legislation could not be entrenched in S.A.R. law by means
of the P.R.C.'s unilateral undertaking (in the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law), that the "laws previously in force" in Hong
Kong would continue in effect.3" That promise covered only the
laws as they stood at the time the P.R.C. made the pledge in
1984.31 While some flexibility to allow necessary legislation over
thirteen years was implied, the sweeping delegation of authority
to change "major laws" implied by the colonial government's
See Chris Yeung & Louis Won, Let S.A.R. Decide on Bill, Says Top Judge,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 30, 1995, at 1 (summarizing remarks of Zhang
Junsheng, deputy director of the Hong Kong Branch of Xinhua, the New
China News Agency, which has been the P.R.C.'s defacto embassy in Hong
Kong); see also China Says Reserves Right to Review Hong Kong Laws, Reuters,
June 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File ("[Beijing] reserves
the right to examine at an appropriate time after 1997 the laws currently in
force in Hong Kong.") (statement of Foreign Ministry spokesman Duan Jin).
21 See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Hold Your Ground, FARE. ECON. REV., Nov. 16,
1995.
29 See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 39 (stating that provisions of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights are to remain in force in
Hong Kong and be implemented through S.A.R. laws), arts. 24-42 (enumerating
specific rights). See also Xinhua Condemns Britain's Stand on Hong Kong Rights,
Agence France Presse, Jan. 29, 1997.
" See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 8, 160; Joint Declaration, supra note 1,
annex I.
" See, e.g., Article Defends China's Position on Law Changes, TA KUNG PAO,
Feb. 5, 1997, at 10 ("The term 'previously in force' . . . refers to the laws in
force at the time of the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration."); Tsang
Yok-sing, Repeal Objections are Out of Order, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
4, 1997, at 16.
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enactment of hundreds of new laws and amendments to key
legislation entailed too serious restrictions on the Chinese
sovereign's discretion. Such a prior, binding commitment to
accept such extensive change was "impossible." It would consti
tute a "blank check" approach to authorizing pre-reversion legisla-
tion with post-1997 effect that was unthinkable from a Chinese-
style positivist perspective.32
In addition, the P.R.C. and its allies in Hong Kong attacked
the substance of the late colonial legal reforms as unacceptably
constraining of sovereign discretion. 3 Having long enjoyed the
benefits of laws empowering them to restrict political activities in
the territory (and having repeatedly asserted their conformity with
international human rights standards), the colonial government
had belatedly moved to exclude such order-supporting and
sovereign-empowering assets from the dowry the P.R.C. and the
S.A.R. government would receive in 1997.34 That the colonial
government had not strictly enforced many of the laws in recent
years was of little import to the P.R.C. Especially from the
positivist perspective to which the P.R.C. and its supporters
adhered, those laws had remained valid legislation available for the
government's use.
Worse still, from the Chinese and pro-P.R.C. perspective, the
Bill of Rights purported to be a new kind of quasi-constitutional
and super-statutory law to which ordinary Hong Kong legislation
32 See Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended ly
British Hong Kong Government is Intended to Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity
and Stability, WEN WEI PO, Jan. 26, 1997, at All; see also Article Defends
China's Position on Law Changes, supra note 31, at 10.
33 See, e.g., Peter Lim, Hong Kong's First Bill of Rights Targets China, Agence
France Presse, June 8, 1991.
34 See, eg., Article Defends China's Position on Law Changes, supra note 31,
at 10 (complaining that "a considerable number of amendments irrationally
decentralized the powers of the government, limited the functions of
government ... [and] restricted the powers of the police and law-enforcement
organs"); Frank Ching, UN to Examine Patten Report, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Oct. 19, 1995, at 38 (describing the Chinese view more generally); Stacy
Mosher, Uncertain Rights, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 4, 1991, at 16 (citing the
Chinese government concern that the bill might hinder post-1997 law
enforcement); Chris Yeung, Tung in a Legal Tangle, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 25, 1997, at 17 ("Hardliners in Beijing" and Hong Kong's "pro-China
circle" see late colonial legal changes as "political plot by Britain to make the
S.A.R. ungovernable.").
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had to conform. 5 In addition to trying to "entrench" substan-
tive principles in a way that prior law had not, the Ordinance and
the changes to the Letters Patent assigned legislative and super-
legislative authority to the judiciary by means of the provisions
that declared pre-existing contrary legislation to be repealed,
mandated Bill-of-Rights-compatible interpretation of subsequent
statutes, and gave the judiciary the authority to determine the
inconsistency of prior ordinances and to undertake "conforming"
interpretations of subsequent legislation.36 From this perspective,
31 See, e.g., Xinhua Criticizes Patten's "Alarmist Statement" in Bill of Rights
Controversy, Xinhua, Oct. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allsi
File ("[The] British side ... unilaterally introduced... the 'Bill of Rights' and
plac[ed] it above all other laws of Hong Kong.").
36 The criticism was based primarily on the Bill of Rights Ordinance
section 3(2), which prescribed that all preexisting legislation not admitting of
a construction consistent with the Bill of Rights Ordinance "is, to the extent
of the inconsistency, repealed"; implicitly on section 6, which provided for
judicial remedies and review for "violations"; on section 4, which directed that
subsequent laws be construed so as to be compatible with the U.N. Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. See, e.g., Article Defends China's Position on Law
Changes, supra note 31, at 10; China on Safeguarding Sino-British Joint
Declaration, Xinhua, Jan. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Librar, Allasi
File. The criticism was also based on the moves to entrench the Bill oRights'
substantive provisions by section 2(3) of the Ordinance (contrary to established
common law practice, pro-China sources claimed) and paragraph 7(3) of the
Letters Patent - British Parliamentary legislation that was the Basic Law's
predecessor as a "constitutional" document for Hong Kong that was beyond
Hong Kong's power to amend. See, e.g., Article Defends China's Position on
Law Changes, supra note 31, at 10. On the Letters Patent, see PETER WESLEY-
SMITH, CONsTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 321-22
(1994).
To understand the objection that the Ordinance gave the courts "legisla-
tive" authority, it is important to recall that constitutional judicial review of
legislation in the American sense is not a part of Hong Kong's British-based
legal system, much less the P.R.C.'s civil law and socialist system. While
criticisms of legislating from the bench are, of course, hardly alien in
discussions of the role of the courts in the United States, the notion of a court
in effect striking down legislation for nonconformity with a written quasi-
constitutional document or undertaking potentially reconstructive interpreta-
tions of statutory text looks more radical in the British system, with its norms
of parliamentary supremacy and the absence of a written constitution, and in
the P.R.C.'s system where principles of parliamentary supremacy and judicial
accountability to legislative organs are constitutionally mandated. Hong Kong's
system has been a bit closer to the U.S. system in that the courts have had
authority to strike down legislation as beyond the limited, delegated authority
of the Governor and Legislative Council, and in that the highest court for
colonial Hong Kong has been the Privy Council in London, which is, of
course, not subordinate to the Hong Kong legislature. See generally id. at 154-
63, 186-95. Still, the power that China aleged the Bill of Rights Ordinance
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the mandate to the judiciary and the attempts at substantive
entrenchment, in effect, sought to make the Bill of Rights, and the
international human rights provisions it tracked, a category of law
that had not previously existed in Hong Kong and that clearly
was meant to restrict the exercise of at least that portion of
China's sovereign power that was to be delegated to the S.A.R.37
These "structural" changes to expand judicial powers and to
create a new, higher type of law, the P.R.C. and its allies added,
had the additional positivist problem of being inconsistent with
the Basic Law and its assumptions of legal continuity. According-
ly, they could not be accepted as laws for the S.A.R., given the
Basic Law's requirements that all S.A.R. laws conform to the Basic
Law and that prior laws that "contravene" the Basic Law would
not survive."
The colonial government and the territory's indigenous liberal
and pro-democracy voices defended the Bill of Rights with largely
naturalist arguments about what fixed principles required Hong
Kong's government to provide to its citizens.39  The Bill of
Rights' principles for reforming substantive laws and specific
changes to laws were, on this view, simply the right thing to do.
Arguments in this vein frequently made reference to international
human rights norms, assumedly of universal application (and
conferred on Hong Kong courts would mark a substantial departure from these
high baselines of judicial power in Hong Kong. The robust role of the courts
in the territory was probably not, in any event, well understood or accepted
in P.R.C. circles charged with addressing Hong Kong questions.
17 Comments from Hong Kong legal officials when the colonial govern-
ment was considering a Bill of Rights added to Chinese concerns, with
Attorney General Jeremy Mathews declaring that a Bill of Rights would be
"supreme" over other Hong Kong law. See Lau, Confidence Building, supra note
22, at 19. Later commentary sought to backpeddle, prompting Chinese
spokesmen to claim that the Hong Kong government sought to "deceive the
Hong Kong people" when it belatedly denied that the Bill of Rights was
supposed to be "supreme." See Chris Yeung & No Kwai-yan, Beijing Slams Bill
'Lies"; Officials "Deceiving Hong Kong People and Misleading Public Opinion,"
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 15, 1995, at 1.
1 See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 8, 160; see also Xinhua Criticizes Patten's
"Alarmist Statement" in Bill of Rights Controversy, supra note 35.
" As one Legco member explained during the debates on the Bill of Rights,
in a passage later quoted approvingly by Governor Patten, "It is incumbent
upon us as legislators... to ensure that we will entrench essential freedoms in
line with" the human rights standards recited in the U.N. Convention on Civil
and Political Rights. Paul Cheng, No Danger of Making Bill of Rights U-Turn,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 27, 1997, at 18.
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codified in key United Nations covenants), that the changes in
Hong Kong law were meant to reflect.'
From this liberal perspective, it was significant that the British
colonial government in recent years had acted in ways generally
consistent with appropriate standards that were only later adopted
as positive law. Indeed, the minimal (but not sole) aim of the Bill
of Rights and amendments to specific laws was to preserve the
generally just (if not fully adequate) legal order that Hong Kong
had enjoyed in practice and that seemed vulnerable, given the
approaching takeover by a regime with a substantially more
checkered record. 1
Tellingly, one aspect of the P.R.C.'s attack on the Bill of
Rights that was particularly troubling to liberal lawyer-politicians
and legally sophisticated government officials in Hong Kong was
the P.R.C.'s objection to the Ordinance as new form of super-
statutory law. Beyond establishing a prospective rule of statutory
construction, all that the Ordinance did in this area, its defenders
insisted, was to provide for statute-based judicial review of
challenged laws that not only was utterly conventional in Hong
Kong, but was also central to any notion of accountable and law-
governed government that accorded any significant role to
courts. 
42
40 See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, No Watchdog, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 7,
1994, at 26 (quoting human rights activist and academic Nihal Jayawickrama
and Legco member Christine Loh). The text of the Bill of Rights Ordinance
itself refers specifically to the U.N. Covenants, in section 4, and is, in this
respect, presumably meant to track article 39 of the Basic Law.
" See, e.g., Emily Lau, Voice of the People, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 8,
1989, at 18 (then-reporter and later leading liberal Legco member Lau noting
the Hong Kong government's tolerance of local rallies in support of the
students at Tiananmen despite such activities being in "direct violation" of the
Public Order Ordinance); Christine Loh, Nothing to Fear from China if We
Stand Firm, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 6, 1995, at 18 (pro-democracy
Legco member, describing Beijing's plans to reverse Bill of Rights as an effortto prevent Hong Kong people from enjoying the freedoms we have grown
used to").
42 On this side of the debate as well, the key provisions were sections 3, 4
and 6. See also Loh, supra note 41, at 18 (Legco member describing Bill of
Rights as "in strict legal interpretation .. only an ordinary law like any other
piece of legislation in Hong Kong. But because it sets minimum standards, the
Government and the judiciary are prepared to check other laws against its.");
Wang Hui Ling, HK Blasts Bid to Scrap Parts of Bill of Rights, STRAiTS TIMES
(Singapore), Jan. 21, 1997, at 17 (Patten criticizing proposed changes as "badnews striking "at the heart of Hongkong's civil liberties" and arguing that the
Bill of Rights provisions to which China objected did not seek to override the
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3.2. The Legislature
In 1992, Hong Kong's new governor, Christopher Patten,
announced proposals to broaden the democratic base of the last
colonial Legislative Council ("Legco"), which was to "ride a
through train" to become the S.A.R.'s first legislature. Adding
nine new functional constituencies with electorates that collective-
ly took in most of the territory's potential voters, expanding the
base for several of the twenty-one existing functional constituen-
cies, providing for the direct election by universal suffrage of
members representing twenty single-member districts, and
establishing a mechanism of indirect popular election for another
ten representatives (by an election committee composed of directly
elected members of local government bodies), the reformed laws
provided for a Legco in which two-thirds or more of the sixty
members would have some claim to a popular electoral man-
date.43 Patten's strategy also included increasing the effective role
of Legco in the governance of the territory by submitting for its
unconstrained debate, and potential rejection, legislation concern-
ing many of the key issues of the transition, including the reforms
to the electoral structure for Legco and bills to establish the Court
of Final Appeal for the S.A.R.
The P.R.C. and its backers in Hong Kong attacked the Patten
reforms and declared that the Legco elected in 1995 under those
laws would be dissolved on July 1, 1997." The arguments again
reflected a Chinese-style positivist vision. Some Chinese leaders
saw a dark plot to compromise the P.R.C.'s sovereignty over
Basic Law and were standard provisions in common law jurisdictions).
" For general discussions of the Patten electoral reforms, see Lo Chi-kin,
From "7Through Train to Second Stove," in FROM COLONY TO S.A.R. 25, 28;
Frank Ching, Cleared for Action, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 20.
Patten's reforms effected a number of other changes as well, including lowering
the voting age to 18 and democratizing the process for selecting members o
lower-level bodies.
" The threat to derail the "through train" was made on numerous
occasions, some before Patten formally proposed his reform plan. The most
formal statement of China's position came in a September 1994 unanimous
resolution by the N.P.C. "to abolish the political structure based on Governor
Chris Patten's electoral reform package." Louise do Rosario, Derailed, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Sept. 22, 1994, at 36; see also Emily Lau, No More 'Concessions,'
FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 30, 1989, at 13 (describing an early warning from
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office deputy director Li Hou of possible
derailment if Britain made too-rapid changes in Hong Kong).
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Hong Kong after 1997 by using democratization of the Legco
selection process and the less formal expansion of Legco's role in
government to create an independent base for subversion.4
The most emphasized problem with Patten's electoral law
reform, however, was its "non-conformity" with the Basic Law,
as well as the Joint Declaration and secret Sino-British agreements
concerning the method for selecting members of the transitional
era legislature. 46 The governor had "perfidious[ly] disregarded"
the Basic Law, "a dignified document which should be strictly
observed" and which could be interpreted only by the N.P.C.
Standing Committee, not by "the British side or Chris Patten
himself."47 Specifically, Patten had introduced broader elections
- particularly through the new functional constituencies and
expansion of old ones - earlier and for a larger portion of Legco
than the framework of positive law and sovereign permission
from the P.R.C. allowed. Among its other problems, the Patten
package violated the Basic Law's mandate for the development of
Legco selection methods "in accordance with the principle of
gradual and orderly progress. "48
For the P.R.C. and its supporters and surrogates in Hong
Kong, it followed that the last colonial Legco could not become
the S.A.R.'s initial legislature. The relevant positive law did not
require it. The N.P.C.'s 1990 "Decision," together with Annex II
to the Basic Law, provided for the "through train," but condi-
tioned it upon the last colonial Legco's "composition" being "in
conformity" with the Decision's requirements that twenty
members be chosen by geographical constituencies, ten by an
election committee and thirty by functional constituencies.49
" See Li Haiting, "Basic Law" Essentially Ensures Democracy for Hong Kong
People, Xinhua, Jan. 9.1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Tai
Ming Cheung, Glacial Thaw, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 22, 1993, at 13 (quoting
Shiu Sin-por, head of the pro-China One Country, Two Systems Economic
Research Institute).
46 See Tai Ming Cheung, Pressure Tactics, FAR E. ECON. RE-V., Nov. 5,
1992, at 8 (statements of Lu Ping, chief of P.R.C. State Council's Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office).
47 Does Chris Patten Want Cooperation or Confrontation?, WEN WEI PO,
Oct. 24, 1996, at 2.
41 Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 68; Text of Chinese Statement on the
Breakdown of Sino.British Talks on Hong Kong, Xinhua, Mar. 2, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
49 Basic Law, supra note 2, annex II.
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According to the Chinese and pro-P.R.C. reading, Patten's
reforms had meant that the 1995-chosen Legco failed to meet that
condition.' Functional constituencies meant narrow, corporate
voting, not the broad electorates the Patten reforms would
introduce for many of those seats.
Moreover, as the Chinese authorities and their Hong Kong
affiliates saw it, the first S.A.R. legislature would have to receive
its authority in good positivist fashion from the Chinese sover-
eign. Even if the "through train" arrangement had held, it would
not have meant that the last colonial legislature would have
survived the transition, outliving the political entity whose
component organ it was. Rather, the people who served in the
last Legco would have been reappointed as members of a new
S.A.R. institution that would be purely a creature of P.R.C.
legislation and could have P.R.C.-established criteria for member-
ship."
With the through train derailed, this line of argument
continued, the P.R.C. was free to establish a Provisional Legisla-
ture for the territory and to invest it with whatever sovereign
authority it thought wise (at least within the limits of what the
Basic Law mandated). As the P.R.C. and its supporters construed
the Basic Law and N.P.C. Decision on the Formation of the First
Legislative Council of the S.A.R., there was nothing in the
relevant framework of positive law to preclude establishing such
a body once the through train was no longer possible. On this
view, the N.P.C. Decision, in authorizing the Preparatory
Committee to "take care of all matters concerning the prepara-
50 See generally Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candidates Formally
Starts, WEN WEI Po, Nov. 18, 1996, at A2; Text of Zhou Nan Speech to First
Session a/ the Provisional Legislature/for the Hong KongS A.R., TA KUNG PAO,
Jan. 26, 1997, at A2 (speech by Xinhua Hong Kong Drector and Preparatory
Committee Vice Chairman Zhou Nan).
"' See, e.g., Frank Ching, Don't Subvert Hon Kong, FAR E. EcoN. REV.,
Nov. 18, 1993, at 34 (describing Chinese pa to scrutinize potential
reapTointees for involvement in "subversive" activities, should the through train
moc elin general survive the conflict over the Patten reforms); David Chu, Fact
and Fiction in the New Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 14, 1996,
at 18; Text of Chinese Statement on the Breakdown of Sino-British Talks on Hong
Kong, supra note 48. A key textual basis for part of the P.R.C. position was
the N.P.C. Decision provision stating that "those of [the last colonial Legco]
members who ... meet the requirements set forth in the Basic Law... may,
upon confirmation by the Preparatory Committee, become members of the first
Legislature of the Region." (emphasis added).
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tions for the setting up" of the S.A.R., had given the Preparatory
Committee authority to establish a Provisional Legislature if need
be. If there were any doubt, the N.P.C. could simply issue a
legislative interpretation of the Basic Law to authorize clearly the
temporary body's creation. 2
As a more general matter, a unilateral move to establish a local
S.A.R. legislature would be an acceptable action, well within the
plenary powers that the P.R.C. enjoyed as Hong Kong's sover-
eign. 3 The P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies pressed this point
further, in recent months even asserting that the Provisional
Legislature meeting in Shenzhen could begin considering proposed
laws for post-reversion Hong Kong.m
Official Chinese sources and like-minded voices in the
territory also suggested that there were good positivist reasons for
making sure a Provisional Legislature was in place on July 1, and
that there was no legal impediment to doing so. Absent such a
body, there would be no local organ to exercise the legislative
functions that the Basic Law conferred and to make indispensable
laws in the early days of the S.A.R. Such a "legislative vacuum"
would be a troubling and untidy state of affairs. 5
In part, the defense of the Patten reforms and the denuncia-
tions of the Provisional Legislature from official quarters in Hong
Kong met the P.R.C. side's arguments on their own terms. Patten
declared his changes to the electoral rules for Legco to be
2 See NtP.C. Decision, supra note 9; Nomination of Provisional Legislature
Candidates Formally Starts, supra note 50, at A2; see also Linda Choy, Attempt
to Affirm Legislature's Legal Status, S. CHNA MORNING POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at
4 (esribngarguments from pro-China. Hong Kong groups that the N.P.C.
sholdisuea new leg"slative interpretation ofteBasic Law to provide clear
authority for the estal~shment of the Provisional Legislature); Procedures for
Formation of Provisional Legislature Are Impartial and Open, WEN WEI PO, July
9, 1996, at A2 (summarizing qualifications established for candidates for
membership in Provisional Legislature).
See, e.g., Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candidates Formally Starts,
supra note 50, at A2.
54 See, e.g., Provisional Legislature Must Be Set Up as Scheduled, TA KUNG
PAO, Oct. 8, 1996, at A2; Provisional Legislature Must Operate Before 1997, WEN
WEI PO, Aug. 31, 1996, at A2.
51 See, e.g., Dominic Lau, China Founds 1997 HK Legislature, Dfies Britain,
Reuters, Dec. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen); Nomination of Provisional Legislature
Canddates Formally Starts, supra note 50, at A2 (stating that the Provisional
Legislature needed to avoid the "legal vacuum"); Provisional Legislature Must
Operate Before 1997, supra note 54, at A2 (making a similar statement).
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consistent with the Basic Law. The colonial government and
Hong Kong politicians objected to the establishment of a
Provisional Legislature and its claims to pre-reversion authority as,
among other things, inconsistent with the arrangements set forth
in the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration."
Still, most of the arguments from the colonial government and
liberal and democratic circles in Hong Kong sounded a less
positivistic note. In principle, what made the Patten reforms
defensible, and even obligatory, was their vital contribution to
establishing a set of law-making (and other governmental)
institutions for Hong Kong that would represent the will of the
territory's citizens, provide public accountability and undergird
the rule of law. Thus, they would provide, both directly and
indirectly, the primary "goods" of a naturalist liberal conception
of a proper legal and political order.1
7
In addition, the understanding in these quarters of the through
train model for Legco seems to have paid little heed to the
P.R.C.'s positivist metaphysics of giving old office-holders new
sources of authority. The point, rather, seems to have been that
a relatively democratically chosen, and therefore fairly legitimate,
group of representatives to a quasi-legislative body would simply
"' See Frank Ching, China Calls a Deer a Horse, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec.
8, 1994, at 32 (claiming that the Provisional Legislature is incompatible with the
Basic Law); Policy Address of Governor Patten, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
3, 1996, at 4 (stating that democratization efforts have been "in line with the
undertakings solemnly accepted by Britain and China"); Tung Attacks Britain,
HKfor Refusing to Recognize Appointed Assembly, Agence France Presse, Dec.
17, 1996 (quoting Martin Lee's "challenge [to] the Provisional Legislature...
to operate in Hong Kong," which would allow Lee to "take them to the courts
[to] decide whether it's constitutional or not" or in violation of the Basic Law
and the Joint Declaration).
57 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Letter from Hong Kong, FAR E. EcON. REV., July
9, 1992, at 24 (describing a Legco member arguing that "speeding up the pace
of democracy" was a matter of necessity and desirability" with a requirement
that "at least half of Legco be directly elected in 1995" as "an absolute
minimum" in order to make possible the "high degree of autonomy" promised
to Hong Kong and to avoid a "morally [in]defensible" result that returning
Hong Kong to China threatened to produce); Martin Lee, Tide of Democracy,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 26, 1992, at 31 (describing a Legco member arguing
that "without democratic and accountable government, we will never be able
to maintain the rule of law"); Policy Address of Governor Patten, supra note 56,
at 4 qinking the democracy of 1995 elections with government openness and
accountability).
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remain in office, undisturbed by the transition.58 Indeed, it was
the P.R.C.'s new appointive body, the Provisional Legislature,
that was "reprehensible," "unjustifiable," and had "a legitimacy
problem," not least because it included several failed candidates
from the 1995 balloting. 9 Its lack of real democratic (as well as
positivist statutory) legitimacy could not be cured.,°
3.3. The Court of Final Appeal
In 1995, the colonial government enacted a Court of Final
Appeal Law which provided, among other things, for a court that
would be established only at the transition, that would include, as
a "temporary member" only one jurist from a foreign common
law jurisdiction on its five-member bench, and that would not
have jurisdiction over "acts of state such as foreign affairs and
defense" or to interpret Basic Law provisions governing relations
between the S.A.R. and the Central People's Government.61
Generally pleased with the legislation, official P.R.C. sources
and like-minded unofficial sources in Hong Kong mounted a less
sustained analysis of the court ordinance's status. Still, there are
hints of familiar styles of argument. When the colonial authori-
ties threatened to act unilaterally to establish a court, the P.R.C.
responded in the same terms as it had to the impasse over the
legislature: anything that the outgoing government did on its
" See, e.g., Patten Behaviour, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 7, 1995 (British
Minister of State with responsibility for Hong Kong declaring, "the British
government, like the Hong Kong government, sees no reason why" the 1995-
elected Legco "should not serve its full, natural four-year term"; former senior
Hong Kong civil servant arguing that "the people of the colony are entitled to
have a free say in the shape of the future Hong Kong government" via their
elected representatives).
19 See Tung Attacks Britain, HK for Refusing to Recognise Appointed
Assembly, Agence France Presse, Dec. 17, 1996 (quoting Patten); see also
Quinton Chan & Clarence Tsui, Patten Blasts Scrapping of Laws, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at 2; Martin Lee, The Wrong Message from China,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 13, 1997, at 19.
60 See, e.g., Martin Lee, Hong Kong Puppet Play, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996,
at 25.
61 Court of Final Appeak The Text in Full, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
10, 1995, at 2 (presenting the text of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
Agreement on C.F.A.); see also Louise do Rosario, A Court Too Far, FAR E.
ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 20 (describing the C.F.A. agreement and bill of
1995); Lu Ping on HK's Court of Final Appeal, Xinhua, May 18, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (quoting the Director of Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office).
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own and without the P.R.C.'s authorization, the P.R.C. would be
free to dismantle and replace.62  At an earlier impasse in the
negotiations leading to the second court deal, the P.R.C. raised the
possibility of establishing a review body superior to the C.F.A.,
a move which could be defended on positivistic grounds that it
was not forbidden by the Basic Law (which provided for the
S.A.R.'s "judicial autonomy" but was silent on the specific
question of a supra-C.F.A. body) and was generally within the
P.R.C.'s sovereign discretion to establish.
Regarding more specific issues, there were suggestions that the
P.R.C. saw a larger number of foreign judges as potentially
threatening to erode the judicial dimension of Chinese sovereignty
over Hong Kong. By world standards, the P.R.C. had been
uncommonly generous in permitting even one foreign national to
serve in so sensitive and powerful a position.63 Moreover,
nothing in the relevant positive laws required more than one
judge. As a matter of valid statutory construction, the Basic Law
article providing for "judges" from a foreign common law
jurisdiction did not require more than one. Indeed, the P.R.C.'s
top official on Hong Kong affairs explained on the eve of the
second C.F.A. deal, the legal arrangement the P.R.C. had in mind
would still leave the question of the number of foreign judges
open for case-by-case, discretionary determination. The four-to-
one ratio, Lu Ping explained, was between "permanent" and
"temporary" members of the court. Because both locals and
foreigners could be on either list, the number of expatriates could
range from zero to four (with the Chief Justice required to be a
Chinese citizen and permanent S.A.R. resident). 4
The fact that the court would not be up-and-running in
62 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Split in Beijing Over Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Apr. 13, 1995, at 34.
63 Cf. One Foreign Judge is Enough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 6,
1994, at 26.
" See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 82. From this perspective, more textual
help was to be found in the equally authoritative Chinese version's use of
faguan, translated well as "judge" or "judges," and the proviso that foreigners
could be invited to serve "as required," which could mean, under appropriate
circumstances, no foreign judges. The Joint Declaration language is virtually
identical. See Joint Dec aration, supra note 1, annex I S III. For Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office Director Lu Ping's argument, see Lu Ping on HK's
Court of Final Appeal, Xinhua, May 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File.
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advance of the shift to Chinese rule gave no reason for concern.
In part a product of Legco's 1991 vote not to support a proposal
very similar to the one it endorsed in 1995, the relatively late
establishment of the court still avoided the relevant danger from
a positivist perspective. As Chinese and pro-P.R.C. commentators
stressed, the 1995 law meant that July 1, 1997, would not bring a
"judicial vacuum" that the Provisional Legislature would have to
scramble to fill by crafting entirely new legislation to set up and
staff the top level of the judiciary.6
Finally, the jurisdiction-limiting provisions were also accept-
able, even necessary, from a Chinese-style positivist perspective.
Granting greater powers to a local court, the P.R.C.'s spokesmen
and supporters seemed to suggest, would risk a dangerous
alienation of central sovereign authority. In any event, the
relevant positive laws again permitted such restrictions on the
court's power: the Basic Law mandated the limits to the court's
power to interpret the Basic Law, and contained "act of state"
language identical to that adopted in the C.EA. Ordinance.
66
Should the colonial government of Hong Kong fail to enact a law
establishing the court, Chinese legal officials argued, the N.P.C.
was authorized under the Basic Law (as well as the Chinese
constitution) to pass C.F.A.-creating legislation containing the
appropriate jurisdictional (and other) limits permitted or required
by the Basic Law.?
A few of the counter-arguments from Hong Kong critics of
the court deal were cast in terms that the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C.
side could find unobjectionable in form, if not persuasive in
content. Some, for example, argued that the statutory term
"judges" from foreign jurisdictions meant more than one judge.68
But, here too, a very different, more naturalist perspective drove
most of the analysis by the bills' opponents and by proponents
who were not generally part of the pro-P.R.C. camp. For
65 See, e.g., Text of Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal
Agreement, WEN WEI PO, June 10, 1995, at A2.
66 See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 19.
67 See Stacy Mosher, Court of Contention, FAR. E. ECON. REv., Dec. 19,
1991, at 11 (quoting former Basic Law Drafting Committee member Wu
Jianfan, invoking article 82 of the Basic Law as authorization for an N.P.C.-
enacted C.F.A. law).
6 See, e.g., C.K. Lau, Judging the Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug.
23, 1995, at 19.
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colonial officials and local politicians of a generally liberal or
democratic stripe, the principal touchstone of the C.F.A. bills'
adequacy was their compatibility with the preservation of Hong
Kong's rule-of-law system and values.
A place for one or more foreign common law jurists on the
highest bench was important as a means of assuring a degree of
insulation from political pressure and, therefore, independence
sufficient to defend the transcendent norms of limited and
accountable government and individual justice that the common
law, at its best, developed and protected." If the limits on the
court's jurisdiction were objectionable, this was primarily because
they threatened to undermine the achievement of government
accountability and government under law.0 The belated estab-
lishment of the court was a problem, if at all, because it raised the
prospect that the court, in practice, would lack the kind of
experience and clout necessary to support the obligatory norms of
good and just laws and governance, regardless of the court's
composition or formal jurisdiction. 1
3.4. The Chief Executive
The legal framework for selecting the S.A.R.'s first Chief
Executive, the official who would head the most powerful branch
of the S.A.R.'s government, was settled early on.72 An Annex
69 See Mosher, Court of Contention, supra note 67, at 10 (describing Legco
supporters of the motion to reject the 1991 C.F.A. Bill as concerned that
accepting the limitation on the number of foreign judges portended possible
curtailment of "other rights and freedoms" that Hong Kong people believed
were "cast in iron" by the Joint Declaration and Basic Law); Louise do Rosario,
Cold Shoulder, FAR E. ECON. RtEv., June 1, 1995, at 25 (describing Legco
members' concern that limiting the court to one foreign judge woud
"compromise the flexibility and professionalism" of the court).
70 See Courting Diaster, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 5 (noting
the P.R.C.'s potentially expansive definition of acts of state).
71 see, e g., Stacy Mosher, Right of Rejection, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Oct. 31,
1991, at 13 stating that setting up the court as soon as possible would permit
the development of "an established international reputation" before reversion);
Louise do Rosario, No Appeal, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 18, 1995, at 22
(describin& the colonial government's push for "rapid establishment of the
court, which is designedf to protect the rule of law," and local politicians
favoring "a truly independent court"); see also Margaret Ng, Time Runs Out/or
the Juddiciary, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 14, 1996, at 21 (articulating the
concerns of Legco member representing the legal functional constituency).
' See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 43-58 (describing the powers and
functions of the Chief Executive).
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to the Basic Law and a separate N.P.C. Decision provided that a
Selection Committee drawn in specified proportions from
different segments of Hong Kong society would recommend a
candidate through "local consultations or through nomination and
election after consultations, and report the recommended
candidate to the Central People's Government for appoint-
ment."7 In December 1996, the office of Chief Executive
became the first of the new S.A.R. posts to have a formally
designated initial occupant, with the naming of the members of
the Provisional Legislature following shortly thereafter.
Although not fully articulated with respect to a set of issues
that were early and securely settled on acceptable terms, the
Chinese and pro-P.R.C. position on the Chief Executive selection
process was fully in step with a familiar positivist perspective.
The filling of this most powerful post for exercising the elements
of the P.R.C.'s sovereign authority allocated to the S.A.R. was a
matter that the legislation governing the S.A.R. kept fairly firmly
in the central Chinese state's ultimate grasp.74 Beijing could have
kept the process entirely in its hands, one pro-P.R.C. source
emphasized, but instead chose to set up a more elaborate mecha-
nism allowing local input.75 Whatever criticisms might flow
from Hong Kong about a P.R.C.-orchestrated charade of democra-
cy, the P.R.C. had been careful to assure that the Basic Law and
other sources authorized the formal process followed in selecting
Tung Chee-hwa as Chief Executive-designate. Moreover, official
Chinese sources and pro-P.R.C. Hong Kong media argued
strenuously that the legally prescribed process had been faithfully
observed: there was no "predetermined" result to the selection
process, and the method of consultation with local interests
contemplated by the Basic Law was being implemented, providing
7' N.P.C. Decision, supra note 9, S§ 34; Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 45,
annex I S 6. Subsequent occupants of the office would be chosen by an
Election Committee double the size of, but similar in composition to, the
initial Selection Committee, with the goal of moving ultimately to a system of
universal suffrage. See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 45, annex I §5 1-5.
74 If control over the selection process were not enough, the Basic Law
provided additional legal levers of control over the Chief Executive, providing
in article 43 that the Chief Executive "shall be accountable to the Central
People's Government" as well as to "the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region."
'5 See Tsang Yok-sing, Skeptics Off Mark Over Chief Executive, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 3, 1996, at 18.
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the people of Hong Kong with the legally requisite level of input,
and more than the British had ever provided in a century and a
half of colonial rule.76
As with the legislature and the court, the P.R.C. here too
showed its positivist abhorrence of a vacuum. Far more than the
court, and more than the legislature, the chief executive has a
good deal of work to do before the reversion. An early selection
to the office was necessary (and necessarily somewhat undemocrat-
ic, given that the P.R.C. could not conduct pre-1997 elections in
Hong Kong) if the S.A.R. government was to be ready to exercise
the powers and perform the governmental duties that the P.R.C.
had assigned to it through the Basic Law.7
In addition, Tung's pointed dropping of the qualifying
"-designate" from his new title (with the P.R.C.'s acceptance) and
his weighing in on the controversy over the propriety of late
colonial amendments to civil and political liberties laws echoed
the broadly positivist point the P.R.C. was pressing in asserting
the Provisional Legislature's pre-1997 authority. Given the
premise of the P.R.C.'s longstanding claim to a nonderogable
sovereignty over Hong Kong that was not and could not have
been transferred to Britain, there was nothing in principle that
could stop the P.R.C. from asserting that sovereignty at any time,
so long as it did so through procedurally proper, positivist means.
According to critics, the P.R.C. saw this as requiring compliance
with only the most narrow readings of the Basic Law and the
Joint Declaration, interpretations that perhaps forbade the direct
and immediate exercise of pre-1997 governmental power, but little
else. 8
Liberal and pro-democracy critics in Hong Kong treated as
irrelevant the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. side's arguments that the
selection process was positivistically valid and statute-regarding.
A' See, eg., Linda Choy, It's a First for Democracy, Says Qian, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 3; The "Predetermination " Theory is Created
for Instigating Confrontation with China, TA KUNG PAO, Nov. 9, 1996, at 10;
Become Masters of Our Own Affairs, Incorporate Different Views, WEN WEI Po,
Aug. 12, 1996, at A2; Wang Hui Ling, We Have No Favourite for HK Chief
Exec: Qian, STRAITs TiMES (Singapore), Nov. 16, 1996, at 20 (quoting Foreign
Minister and Vice-Premier Qian Qichen).
" See, e.g., Face Reality Squarely, Promote Cooperation, TA KUNG PAO, Feb.
13, 1997, at A2.
' See generally Bruce Gilley, Jumping the Gun, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb.
6, 1997, at 14.
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The problems these critics stressed were, not surprisingly,
substantive and normative shortcomings offensive to a liberal and
naturalist perspective. Principally, the process had been so
controlled by the P.R.C. (with Tung's implicit anointment
coming in the form of a February 1996 handshake with Chinese
leader Jiang Zemin) that norms of accountability to the governed
in Hong Kong had been violated early on with respect to this
most significant of S.A.R. offices.79 The process was too remote
from the avowed longer term goal of universal suffrage-based
election to warrant much respect and credibility in democratic
quarters.80  Moreover, even before Tung's de facto selection
became clear, the short list of candidates acceptable to the P.R.C.
was dominated by those who seemed very unlikely to regard the
office as one that carried obligations to uphold the largely liberal
and democratic norms that many Hong Kong politicians and the
Governor saw as central to just and valid laws and government.
From this perspective, it was significant and distressing that
former Chief Justice Sir Yang Ti Liang had expressed reservations
about the Bill of Rights as a grant of legislative power to the
judiciary, and that Tung Chee-hwa, early in his tenure as Chief
Executive-designate, had made clear his view that liberal reforms
to public order laws endangered social order and should be
revised."1
"' See Bruce Gilley, Playing Favourites, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 8, 1996,
at 22; Bruce Gilley, The Common Touch, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1996,
at 34.
" The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee had supported this
line early on (according to critics, to relieve pressure to permit greater
immigration to the U.K. from Hong Kong), calling in 1989 For democratic
elections for the chief executive by early 1997. See Emily Lau, Abide with Me,
FAR E. ECON. REV., July 13, 1989, at 11. Some Hong Kong pro-democracy
politicians were quite strident in their critiques of the "sham" election. See
C.K. Lau, A Question of Trust, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 1996, at 21;
Emily Lau, Our Duty to Expose Election Charade, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 25, 1996, at 26.
" See Chief Executive Says "Colonial Laws" Not to be Adopted, Xinhua, Jan.
24, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Bruce Gilley, Enter
the Judge, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 12, 1996, at 14; Danny Gittings, The Case
for Challenging China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at 9
(concerning Yang); Peter Lim, Democrats, Human Rights Groups Slam Hong
Kong's Tung on Law Change, Agence France Presse, Jan. 24, 1997 (concerning
Tung); Tung Says PC Legal Panel Recommendation is Right, Xinhua, Jan. 23,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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4. INDETERMINATE VISIONS, HONG KONG POLITICS, AND
THE QUESTION OF "RULE OF LAW" VALUES
When the struggle to shape Hong Kong's future shifted to
such concrete matters concerning the Bill of Rights Ordinance,
the transition era Legislature, the Court of Final Appeal deal, and
the selection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive, the change in
focus did little to bridge the gap between the notions of domestic
sovereignty and lawmaking that divided the principal participants
into two camps. As we have seen, each side remained committed
to the proposition that the laws and institutions for the S.A.R.
had to be legitimate in terms of its vision. Indeed, the conflict in
some respects sharpened. With the advent of the endgame,
fundamental disagreements about the standards of validity could
no longer be hidden in abstractions and generalities or postponed
for resolution in a later round of negotiations. At the same time,
the P.R.C.'s violent suppression of the pro-democracy movement
in the mainland in 1989, and Governor Patten's introduction of
political reforms that the P.R.C. deemed provocative in 1992
brought a new air of mutual mistrust to the process. The
deepening clash, however, is only one side of a more complex
story.
4.1. Indeterminate Visions
Seemingly paradoxically, while the endgame thus continued
and arguably stiffened each side's insistence upon its own version
of the proper basis and minimally acceptable content of S.A.R.
laws and institutions, the endgame also brought a shift in focus to
questions for which broad visions of law and sovereignty dictated
no single answer. In key conflicts over matters of legal and
institutional detail, the visions have been indeterminate, and their
adherents' positions on specific issues flexible and varied.
From the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. perspective, the principle that
S.A.R. laws and institutions had to have a proper proceduralist
pedigree and could not unduly restrict sovereign discretion often
said little about many of the substantive concerns of the moment.
Changes in this camp's positions on such matters, and discernible
differences among its members's views, reflect the indeterminacy.
For example, official Chinese sources sometimes insisted that the
Bill of Rights as a whole and all of the substantive changes
wrought by the Bill of Rights Ordinance and other eleventh-hour
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statutory reforms were ripe for reversal."2 At other times, the
P.R.C. and its Hong Kong affiliates, while unwavering in their
view that the colonial authorities' actions were illegitimate
(particularly in trying to create a new, supreme type of law),
focused more narrowly on lists of specific legal reforms that had
to be reversed. Those lists varied somewhat over time, with the
Preliminary Working Committee first emphasizing six offensive
laws and later proposing a much longer list that the Preparatory
Committee shortened to twelve, and modified again in its formal
recommendations to the N.P.C. (which the N.P.C. has accept-
ed). 3  Pro-P.R.C. elements in Hong Kong were sometimes
relatively circumspect, saying that a broad repeal of the Bill of
Rights would be unwise or unnecessary, demanding only that
some of its more troubling provisions be removed and the worst
of the changes to other ordinances reversed.1
4
Similarly, while Patten's electoral reforms were deemed
unacceptable, the P.R.C. and its allies could contemplate any
82 See, e.g., China Softens Its Line, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 4, 1993
(describing Lu Ping's retreat from threatening to repeal the Bill of Rights to
requiring that it be modified to conform to the Basic Law); Emily Lau, Better
Late Than Never, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 12, 1990, at 16 (summarizing
Chinese official reaction to the initial Bill of Rights proposal).
11 On the roposals of the P.R.C.-established Preliminary Working
Committee (the bocfy established to pave the way for the transition-overseeing
Preparatory Committee) see, for example, China Comes Courting, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995, at 7; Bruce Gilley, Hold Your Ground, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995, at 36. On the Preparatory Committee's approach,
see Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended [r British
Hong Kong Government Is Intended to Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and
Stability, supra note 32, at All; Suggestions of the Preparatory Committee of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the National People's Congress on
Handling the Issue of Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong, Xinhua, Feb. 4,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
" See, e.g., Connie Law, Plea for China to Keep Rights Bill, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 17, 1995, at 4 (quoting P.W.C. legal subgroup member's
view that it would be better not to repeal the Bill of Rights); Catherine Ng,
Curbing Rights Bill "Bad Precedent," S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 22, 1995,
at 2 (quoting Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong leader
Tsang Yok-sing, "The Bill of Rights is just an ordinary law .... under the
common law system [where] new legislation should be taken into account by
all others which were introduced earlier."); Tung Chee-hwa Clarifies Seven Points
in Misunderstandin Stressed Hong Kong S.A.R. Will Make Laws on its Own, TA
KUNG PAO, Feb. 6, 1997, at A12 (stating that only sections 2(3), 3 and 4 of the
Bill of Rights needed to be removed, and the rest of the Bill and substantial
portions of the amended Public Order and Societies Ordinances could be
retained).
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number of positivistically valid arrangements for a transitional-era
legislature, including the initial through-train model, an appointive
provisional legislature some of whose members could be drawn
from the last Legco (as in fact ultimately occurred), a new
legislature chosen by fresh elections or, if necessary, no legislature,
leaving legislative power to be exercised by the N.P.C. or perhaps
by the S.A.R.'s Chief Executive or the Preparatory Committee."
The choice was a matter of sovereign policy and prudential
calculation.
Moreover, pro-P.R.C. parties in Hong Kong could field
candidates to contest the very elections that the P.R.C. held were
illegitimate and vowed would have no post-1997 effect."6 Addi-
tionally, pro-P.R.C. politicians in the territory argued for
retaining some elements of the through train, and cautioned
Beijing against precipitous moves to set up a "second stove" - a
shadow government well in advance of 1997 - in reaction to the
Patten reforms.17  Boycotting the elections and establishing pre-
1997 institutions to rival or partially displace the colonial
The N.P.C.'s initial acceptance, and ultimate rejection, of the through
train model suggest the range of options acceptable at one time or another to
P.R.C. authorities. With the through train derailed, the territory's leading pro-
P.R.C. party saw the conceivable recipients of lawmaking authority over Hong
Kong on July 1, 1997 as including a provisional legislature, the Chief Executive,
the Preparatory Committee (to be established in 1996), or the N.P.C. or its
Standing Committee. See Louise do Rosario, Hollow House, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Nov. 24, 1994, at 27; Nomination of Provisional Legislature Candidates
Formally Starts, supra note 50, at A2; see also David Chu, Fact and Fiction in the
New Lqgislature, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 14, 1996 (suggesting that
post-July 1 elections were impractical, given the legislative vacuum pro lem,
and that pre-July 1 elections for a new legislature raised a mixture of practical
and constitutional problems).
86 Some sources also pointed to differences within the P.R.C. government
about how to react to the Patten reforms and related issues. See Tai Ming
Cheung, Changing Signals, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 4, 1993, at 13. See also
Louise do Rosario, Board Games, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 8, 1994, at 19
(noting the pro-China parties' participation in the elections, and pro-China
newspaper Wen Wei Po's endorsement of elections).
7 See Louise do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Sept. 28, 1995, at 17 (stating that D.A.B. calls for members of the Provisional
Legislature to be elected, with members of 1995-elected Legco automatically
among the candidates); Bruce Gilley, Old Game, New Strategy, FAR E. ECON.
REV., May 23, 1996, at 32 (pro-China business leader David Chu's pledge to
press China to declare Martin Lee eligible for the Provisional Legislature); Tai
Ming Cheung, FrontalAssault, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 1, 1993, at 11 (quoting
Tsang Yok-sing of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
concerning the "second stove" option).
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government were doubtless within China's positivist sovereign
authority, as such politicians conceived it. But that did not
necessarily make such moves obligatory or wise.
In the same vein, some of the specific restrictions on the Court
of Final Appeal's jurisdiction and the particular ceiling on its
foreign membership were explained primarily as the P.R.C.'s
policy choices and not as the necessary implications of Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong.88 Lu Ping's view that the four-to-
one ratio could permit zero to four foreign judges certainly
implied considerable indeterminacy (and at least feigned flexibility)
on a key point. As the P.R.C.'s support for both the 1991 and
1995 C.F.A. bills indicated, there was also a good deal of political
flexibility in the P.R.C.'s perspective about when the S.A.R.'s
high court properly could be established. The P.R.C.'s raising,
and then dropping, the possibility of creating a body superior to
the C.F.A., and subordinate to the N.P.C., to review C.F.A.
decisions suggests further indeterminacy in the P.R.C.'s notion of
an acceptable and permissible structure for S.A.R. judicial institu-
tions.
The kind of indeterminacy that produced such variety had
always been present, but not previously so relevant, in the P.R.C.
and pro-P.R.C. side's sovereign discretion-protecting, positivist
vision. 9 What was different about the endgame was the charac-
ter of the issues at stake. The choices that the P.R.C. and its
future Hong Kong subordinates faced during this period were ones
of policy preference and instrumental calculation. With the focus
thus shifted, the values that key Hong Kong communities hold or
might be persuaded to hold also began to matter a great deal.
How much could or should the P.R.C. accommodate Hong Kong
groups' possibly unpalatable views concerning what future laws
and institutions should look like, and what an adequate "rule of
88 See generally Text of Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal
Agreement, supra note 65, at A2. Also notable in this re~ard is China's having
pushed for, and then dropped, a provision to establish a post verdict remedial
mechanism" that threatened to undermine the finality of the C.F.A.'s decisions
and thus its credibility as the principal organ of a "high degree of judicial
autonomy" for Hong Kong.
Protecting sovereign discretion was also the point of the constraints the
positivist perspective imposed on the sovereign - prohibitions on alienating or
destroying the sovereign's discretionary authority and requirements that the
sovereign act through procedural mechanisms that were as much empowering
as they were constraining.
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law" should require? How much could the P.R.C. and its allies
in the territory hope to change those views and reduce the need
for prudential accommodation or, in the event of vastly divergent
views, close the gap to a point where accommodation might be
possible?
For the British colonial authorities and Hong Kong's "liberal"
or "pro-democracy" elements, the endgame has had a similar
effect. From the broadly naturalist perspective that they share,
the principle that the laws and institutions of the S.A.R. should
meet the standards of a just and good order did not dictate
precisely what all of those laws and institutions should look like.
In other words, it did not generate unique answers to many of the
questions at issue in transitional Hong Kong's endgame.
Again, publicly expressed differences within the loosely knit
camp illustrate the scope for diversity, or at least claims of
diversity, within the vision. For example, the shared notion that
Hong Kong's government must be publicly accountable and
sufficiently democratic meant different things to different people
when it came to specific questions about the territory's transition-
al legislature. Although substantially bolder than his predecessors,
Governor Patten painted a relatively modest vision of what was
required. What was necessary was a government that represented
the will of the Hong Kong people, "accountable to a broadly
based legislature," providing both "sufficient democracy to help
secure Hong Kong's way of life" and "laws democratically enacted
and rooted in the community."' That goal could be meaningful-
ly advanced by electoral reforms that, by Patten's own account,
were far from radical.91
Legco members Martin Lee and Emily Lau and others among
the territory's more ardent democrats, in contrast, insisted that
Hong Kong needed an indigenous democratic legislature, prefera-
bly one with universal suffrage for all seats.92 As Lee saw it, a
0 Interview: Chris Patten, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 22.
See Question ofHonour, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 1, 1993, at 12 (quoting
Patten, "I freely confess that mny proposals are not a great step forward towards
democracy for Hong Kong. They aren't even a small step.").
9' See Louise do Rosario, Patten's Progress, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 14,
1994, at 21 (describing Emily Lau's proposal, one that came close to winning
a majority in Legco, calling for universa[ suffrage for all seats in the 1995 Legco
elections); Lee, Tide of Democracy, supra note 57, at 31 (criticizing Patten
reforms for making only one-third of Legco seats subject to direct elections).
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substantially democratized Legco with a greater role in govern-
ment was necessary to provide a replacement for the vicarious
democratic accountability that the British Parliament had been
providing. 3 Under the colonial regime, a lack of local legislative
democracy was perhaps acceptable. Absent such true democratic
oversight after 1997, government accountability and legality were,
on this view, at risk.
A similar dynamic characterized the debate over the Court of
Final Appeal. The colonial government defended the C.F.A. bills
as creating an arrangement that would preserve the rule of law
and guarantee adequate judicial independence.94 In contrast,
leading democratic politicians denounced the arrangement as a
betrayal of the same core substantive values, insisting that a viably
independent court that protects the rule of law could not be so
constrained in its membership and jurisdiction.95 Even within
the narrower group of "pro-democracy" Hong Kong politicians,
there was substantial division over whether the statutory provi-
sions precluding review of "acts of state" posed a serious threat to
law-governed and judicially accountable government. 6
Finally, shared notions that justice demanded accountable and
"' See Tai Ming Cheung, Advance to the Rear, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar.
18, 1993, at 11 (describing the concern of pro-democracy Legco members
Martin Lee and Christine Loh that negotiations for compromise between
Patten proposals and Chinese demands could be a "sell-out" of democracy for
Hong Kong); Lee, supra note 23, at 11 (making the argument about Parliament).
9' On British enthusiasm for the 1991 package that received unenthusiastic
responses from the Hong Kong bar, see Stacy Mosher, Local Justice, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Oct. 10, 1991, at 12. With regard to the 1995 bill, it is, of course,
possible that the argument in favor of the bill was disingenuous, a face-saving
effort by a colonial government that knew it had failed. If so, it is still telling
that the British authorities made the argument. It suggests that they thought
it at least sounded plausible. And it stands in contrast to more uncompromis-
ing stances they took toward China regarding issues on which the colonial
authorities' position was equally unlikely to prevail (including several contro-
versies over the legislature).
s See Martin Lee, The Courtship of Mr. Hoare, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 27,
1995, at 4 (Democratic Party leader and Legco member's charging that the
colonial government-supported C.F.A. bill achieved a court that China would
accept "at the cost of the rule of law itself after 1997"); Louise do Rosario,
Down But Not Out, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 27, 1995, at 27 (describing
Democratic Party and Legco member Cheung Man-kwong's denunciation ot
the C.F.A. bill as Patten's "burying the common-law system").
96 See Louise do Rosario, Future Imperfect, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 10,
1995, at 27 (citing the views of Martin Lee and legal academic Raymond
Wacks).
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law-governed government also seemed to produce no unanimity
with respect to the selection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive.
Many of Hong Kong's most prominent and partisan politicians
attacked the P.R.C.'s manipulation and control of the selection
process, impugning the claim to authority of an official chosen by
methods that in practice departed so far from minimally demo-
cratic bases. As Tung's statements on rolling back legal reforms
amply demonstrated to such critics, Tung was likely to be a
puppet of the Beijing authorities who had controlled the selection
process (and who had engineered a bail-out of Tung's troubled
shipping firm in the 1980s).9' The colonial government, in
contrast, saw no such fundamental principles at stake. Having
initially refused executive branch contact with the P.R.C.'s ad hoc
Preliminary Working Committee and having rejected out of hand
cooperation with the Provisional Legislature, the Governor and
his administration moved to cooperate closely with a Chief
Executive-designate whose appointment was no more beyond
Hong Kong's control than the selection of colonial governors had
been, and whose successors, the Basic Law promised, were to be
chosen by properly democratic methods. 8  As the British
authorities saw it, working with the incoming executive to assure
a well-prepared new administration and a smooth transition was
precisely the sort of collaboration that the Joint Declaration
contemplated and that norms of responsible government demand-
ed.
Such room for differing interpretations of what, precisely, the
principled norms of sovereign obligation required in practice was
newly salient, but not new, in the broadly naturalist and liberal-
democratic vision embraced by the diverse band of the P.R.C.'s
antagonists in the struggle to shape Hong Kong's future order. In
the context of the endgame, the key questions had become the
' See, e.g., C.K. Lau, A Question of Trust, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec.
12, 1996, at 21; Emily Lau, Tung Must Be Able to Act with Autonomy, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 6, 1997, at 18; Peter Humphrey, HK's Next Leader Called
China Yes-Man, Reuters, BC Cycle, Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File (quoting Legco member Martin Lee); Tan Ee Lyn, HK
Democrat Emily Lau Dragged Away, 29 Arrested, Reuters, Dec. 11, 1996,
available in LEXIS, AsiapcLibrary, Allasi File.
" See Bruce Gilley, Facing Up to Reality, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 9, 1996,
at 16; Chris Yeung, Tung Fails to Win over Governor, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 24, 1996, at 1; Policy Address of Governor Patten, supra note 56, at
4.
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intramurally debatable ones about what presumably fixed and true
general principles required in the particular, complex, and
changing circumstances of Hong Kong on the eve of reversion.
And the values major groups in Hong Kong already embraced or
might be convinced to adopt were an important part of those
circumstances. Most obviously, lawmaking and law-interpreting
institutions that represented the will and values of Hong Kong's
residents and that were accountable to the territory's citizenry
might look rather different if Hong Kongers embraced, for
example, values supportive of the Democratic Party's agenda
rather than values in step with the colonial government's
positions, much less those espoused by Hong Kong's pro-P.R.C.
parties.
4.2. Hong Kong Politics
In addition to the emergence of the inherent indeterminacy of
broad visions of domestic law and sovereignty, more immediately
practical features of the endgame also pressed participants in the
political wrangling over Hong Kong to pay more attention to the
values Hong Kong citizens hold or might hold. For reasons at
most loosely related to differences between the principal political
participants' broad conceptions of law and sovereign authority,
the issues and conflicts that dominated Hong Kong's last years as
a colony often involved the territory's residents more directly
than they had been in earlier phases.
The Joint Declaration had dealt with abstract questions of
sovereignty and sketchy representations of a legal and constitu-
tional order that would not be fully implemented until nearly
fifteen years later. Moreover, Hong Kong had been excluded
from negotiations that, the P.R.C. insisted, could be conducted
only between the two sovereigns with interests in the territory.
The Basic Law, to be sure, addressed issues that were of increas-
ingly immediate concern in the territory, and did so through a
process that involved Hong Kongers. After all, the Basic Law
established a framework for Hong Kong's post-reversion domestic
laws and government institutions, and did so in part through a
Basic Law Drafting Committee and a Basic Law Consultative
Committee that included Hong Kong citizens. Nonetheless, the
Basic Law remained a relatively skeletal document that provided
a constitution for a political entity that would not come into
being for almost a decade. And, formally (and certainly in
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practice), it was a P.R.C. document, its provisions securely beyond
Hong Kong's power to change and, in some respects, even to
interpret.
During the 1990s, however, the key controversies concerned
the specific characteristics of the laws and institutions under which
Hong Kongers would have to live and work in the near term.
The process of addressing those issues and conflicts involved
considerable numbers of Hong Kong residents as constituents for
an increasingly democratic Legco membership that was given an
opportunity to weigh in on colonial legislation to amend relevant
laws or structure key institutions, as members of the ever larger
and more influential advisory, preparatory and nominating bodies
that the P.R.C. established to help manage the transition, or as
participants in the mass street demonstrations that became a staple
of Hong Kong politics after the Chinese authorities crushed the
Democracy Movement on the mainland in 1989. In this context,
it became perilous, and perhaps impossible, to slight the attitudes
that people in Hong Kong held, or might come to hold, toward
"rule of law" questions in general and in relation to the laws and
institutions that were the focus of the period's politics.
In addition, two major political events made such actual or
potential values in Hong Kong still more pressing concerns for the
political elites, of whatever stripe, who were working to shape the
details of the S.A.R.'s key laws and core government institutions.
First, in 1989, the pro-democracy protests at Tiananmen Square
electrified Hong Kong, prompting mass rallies in the territory to
support the movement and supportive comments from some of
the territory's leading tycoons.99 The violent suppression of the
protests in China triggered shock, additional mass demonstrations
and growing public pressure in Hong Kong to take steps, through
local legislation and in the on-going discussions with the P.R.C.
over the territory's future laws and institutions, to reduce the risk
that Hong Kong would face an equally repressive, and seemingly
lawless, future under Chinese rule.
These events brought sustained higher levels of political
engagement and mobilization in the territory. The immediate
consequence was broader and more ardent public support for the
liberal, legalist and democratizing agenda that some of the
territory's emergent political leaders and, to a lesser degree, the
" See, e.g., Lau, Voice of the People, supra note 41, at 18.
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colonial authorities were advocating. Indirectly, the disorder that
mass protests seemed to portend, and the adverse economic
consequences that a likely harsh P.R.C. reaction to such activities
surely would threaten, prompted reactions in some more conserva-
tive or previously apolitical circles. The concern manifested in
those quarters suggested potential support for a very different
approach to the legal and institutional issues of the endgame, one
more in keeping with the P.R.C.'s notion of a tolerable legal and
institutional order.
Second, in 1992, the installation of Christopher Patten as
Hong Kong's last colonial governor brought a greatly increased
commitment by the Hong Kong government to expand the role
of the territory's residents in the territory's government. Patten's
reforms accelerated a previously creeping process of democratizing
the electoral process for Legco and other bodies, and he accorded
the increasingly democratic Legco a greater voice in the vital legal
and policy debates of the era. Drawing on experience in electoral
politics that his predecessors had lacked, Patten also introduced a
bit of British-style campaign politics to his own dealings with the
citizenry, seeking to measure their mood and rally their support
in a way, and to an extent, that no prior colonial governor
had."°
As with Tiananmen, the direct effect here also was to bring
forth constituencies supportive of the liberal or pro-democracy
agenda and its underlying vision of sovereignty and the rule of
law. The democratic parties and pro-democracy independents
were the big winners in the elections held under the expanded
franchise and became the most prominent voices in Legco. And
Patten's message, sometimes rousing and sometimes temperate,
was consistently rooted in a liberal and naturalist conception of
how the issues of the endgame should be addressed. Here too,
however, the indirect effect was also to make more politically
relevant Hong Kong groups that were committed, or at least
open, to very different perspectives and values. Pro-P.R.C. and
conservative business interests formed parties, both to contest the
elections and more generally to increase their effectiveness in the
newly partisan and mass-oriented politics that the reforms had
"' For a brief description of Patten's political background, see James
Bartholomew & Stacy Mosher, Last Viceroy, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 7, 1992,
at 15.
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introduced. On both sides, it had become necessary to worry
about how proposed answers to the legal and institutional
questions dominating the era played, or might be made to play,
with key elements in an expanded world of Hong Kong politics.
4.3. Battling over "the People" and the Business Community: A
Synopsis of Strategies
Britain, the colonial government, Hong Kong's liberal and
democratic political leaders, the P.R.C., and its agents and allies
in the territory have responded to the broadening scope of Hong
Kong politics, and its shift in focus to concrete questions that
immediately concern Hong Kongers and that do not have
determinate answers under the visions of law and sovereignty long
embraced by the two major political camps. On both sides, this
response has included complex and shifting strategies to find and
to build support - or at least acquiescence - among key segments
of Hong Kong society for general positions on rule-of-law values
and specific solutions to the legal and institutional issues of the
era. While these strategies have targeted a number of groups
(including, for example, Hong Kong's civil servants), the primary
addressees have been "the people of Hong Kong" and the business
community.
Although clearly explicable in terms of recent changes in
Hong Kong politics and the pressures of the reversion date's
approach, the focus on "the people" in the battle over the
territory's political and legal future is ironic and slightly odd.
Long excluded from Hong Kong politics and accorded an inferior
status under its laws, they have finally become a central concern,
but only in the context of a political conflict that ignores their
considerable diversity. In addressing "the people" (implicitly
limited to the middle and lower economic classes of the over-
whelmingly ethnic Chinese population), both sides in the political
struggle have ignored vast differences in wealth, education,
rootedness in Hong Kong, and even ideological orientation among
their target group. They have addressed an undifferentiated
"people of Hong Kong" with strategies that mix appeals to
principle, inclination, and interest.
The "liberal" or "democratic" argument to, and about, "the
people" has claimed that the interests and preferences of the
territory's ordinary citizens demand the preservation of the values
embodied in Hong Kong's late colonial rule-of-law system,
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including its institutions of government accountability. According
to the more sweeping version of this argument pressed by some
pro-democracy politicians, the people also require the liberalizing
and democratizing reforms of recent years, and perhaps more.
Asserting that the people strongly embrace such norms and views,
the colonial authorities and the territory's most popular politicians
have made descriptive claims about mass public attitudes. At the
same time, they have also sought to persuade a "people" whom
they at times admitted was not yet ardently enough committed to
the liberal and democratic agenda, especially in its more radically
reformist versions.
Such claims about popular normative orientations, and such
efforts to cultivate them, have coexisted with more direct appeals
to "the people's" immediate and material interests. Rolling back
the Bill of Rights and civil liberties legislation and dismantling the
elected legislature would not only fly in the face of popular
preference; it would also harm the territory's stability and
prosperity, either by unravelling the rule of law upon which
Hong Kong's success depended, or by so angering "the people"
(and foreign investors as well) that they would forcefully reject
such moves, with disastrous consequences for stability and
prosperity. Many of Hong Kong's liberal politicians, but not the
colonial government, have argued to the people that similar risks
flow from the Court of Final Appeal deal and the undemocratic
selection of the Chief Executive.
The P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. camp's approach to "the Hong
Kong people" has included a similarly mixed focus on values and
interests, but with clearly different content. Accepting that the
rule of law is subjectively and objectively important to the
territory's citizenry, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong supporters
have argued that what the people need and want is a rule of law
that does not so slavishly follow the colonial inheritance or
embrace radical and potentially dangerous reforms. Seeking to tap
the pride that ordinary Hong Kongers feel in the territory's
remarkable accomplishments and the considerable nationalist
sentiments that underlie popular ambivalence about colonial rule,
such arguments have asserted that the Hong Kong people do,
should, or must recognize that their own special (and distinctly
Chinese) qualities and values are largely responsible for Hong
Kong's success, and that a less fully liberal or Western-style rule
of law is what they want and need.
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At the same time, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies have
argued to the people that accepting the Chinese position on the
territory's future rule-of-law regime and on specific legal and
institutional issues is a matter of pragmatism as well as principle
or preexisting preference. That has been one of the points of the
arguments asserting that the British-style rule-of-law has contribut-
ed relatively little to Hong Kong's remarkable stability and
prosperity, and that Hong Kong's past successes have been
achieved despite the absence of the liberal and democratic
structures that the colonial authorities and their sometime allies
in Legco were trying to instill on the eve of reversion. The
P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. side has cautioned that failure to roll back
the government-weakening reforms to civil liberties laws, exclude
"subversives" from the initial legislature, or restrict judicial power
to overturn government decisions would produce social and
political instability in Hong Kong that would be harmful to the
preferences and interests of the people. Moreover, Chinese and
pro-P.R.C. sources have warned that accepting the line peddled by
the territory's "pro-democracy" politicians or its colonial governor
would surely bring conflict and problems in S.A.R.-mainland
relations. On this view, it simply would not be good for the
people of Hong Kong to have a legislature full of people who
could not communicate effectively with the P.R.C., a Chief
Executive whose authority was under incessant attack locally, and
a set of laws conducive to activities inimical to Chinese sovereign-
ty-
That the principal parties to the ongoing battle over the
territory's future laws and institutions also would focus on the
business community is not surprising, given that group's obvious
importance in maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity, and the
attention that the colonial government and the P.R.C. leadership
have long lavished on business elites and their interests when
making policies concerning the territory. Yet, here too, the
endgame has brought a more strikingly political battle in which
the target group has been addressed as a relatively uniform whole,
with little regard for differences between venerable trading houses
and fast-rising entrepreneurs, ethnic Chinese tycoons and foreign-
based multinational corporations, enterprises dependent on Hong
Kong revenues and conglomerates with extensive investments in
the mainland. Both sides have addressed and sought to convince
"business" with strategies parallelling those they have used with
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respect to "the people."
Prominent Hong Kong politicians and senior colonial
government officials have asserted that members of the business
community do, or should, accept a broadly liberal and democratic
version of rule-of-law values and concomitant positions on the
legal and institutional questions of the day. Business already
knows, or must soon recognize, that it requires strong legal
protection of civil liberties, a publicly (and, as some Hong Kong
politicians see it, fully democratically) accountable legislature (and
executive) to enact and oversee laws, and an independent judiciary
with broad jurisdiction to review burdensome government action
and to enforce contracts even against well-connected or state-
owned Chinese firms. On the liberal or pro-democracy view,
these things are goods that business owes it to Hong Kong to
support, that are essential to the lifestyle many business elites
want, and that provide necessary support for Hong Kong's
thriving economy.
Such arguments, of course, shade into straight-forward appeals
to business leaders' presumed self-interest. The more "pragmatic"
line of argument also has included dire warnings about the
economic consequences of acquiescing in the legal and institutional
regime (and its underlying "thin" theory of legality and sovereign-
ty) that the P.R.C. prefers.
In response, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies have argued
that Hong Kong's business elites do, or at least should, reject
much of the liberal agenda as politically destabilizing and
economically enervating, and demand nothing from S.A.R. laws
and institutions beyond what the P.R.C. has assured them it will
provide. Business should and would welcome, the pro-P.R.C. line
of argument has continued, a legislature not dominated by radical
democrats, a chief executive who shares their concerns and values,
and civil liberties and economic laws conducive to social order and
Hong Kong's established, and often informal, ways of doing
business.
Further, sources on the P.R.C. side have made it clear that
business support for the positions urged by the territory's liberal
politicians, and sometimes by its colonial rulers, would make it
more likely that major questions concerning the reception of prior
laws, the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive would remain
unsettled up to the reversion date and perhaps beyond. Such
"uncertainty" and the prospects of a judicial or legislative
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"vacuum- are, the P.R.C. and its supporters have repeatedly
reminded their business audience, contrary to the preferences and
interests of the business community. Appealing still more crassly
to the self-interest of business elites, the P.R.C. has sometimes
signalled that those in the business community who backed
Patten's or the Democrats' agenda faced possible economic
retribution.101
This brief sketch of the strategies for claiming and cultivating
support among key groups in Hong Kong adds a final piece to the
mosaic of political struggles over legal and institutional questions
in transitional Hong Kong's endgame. Naked, cynical, even
thuggish appeals to the self-interest of "the people" or "business"
coexist with more principled arguments - some asserting or
urging preferred rule-of-law values and compatible legal and
institutional commitments among the target social groups, and
others insisting that proposed solutions to the controversies of the
period are, or are not, legitimate in terms of fundamental
principles of sovereignty and domestic law. As we have seen, the
last of these types of argument has also characterized a conflict
among political players that has not explicitly focused on the
people or the business community. As this overlapping of
"principled" arguments suggests, battles over the concrete
implications of basic principles of law and sovereignty and battles
for the allegiance of key Hong Kong constituencies are bound
together in the broader picture of the conflict over Hong Kong's
future legal and institutional order. The boundaries between the
"purely political-legal" struggle and the battle for "social support"
are, of course, illusory. Business elites and ordinary citizens have
been among the known, and often intended, audiences of
ideological debates nominally not addressed to them. At the same
time, the principal political players have been addressing one
another as much as any popular or business audience when they
have argued about socially immanent rule-of-law values and the
interests and preferences of social groups.
This Article has explored the first of these two battles and the
101 For a more extensive discussion of the conflict over the business
community, see Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Cooking the Rice Without
Cooking the Goose: The Rule of Law, the Battle Over Business, and the Quest for
Prosperity in Hong Kong After 1997, in HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE:
THE EcONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSION (Warren I.
Cohen & Li Zhao eds., 1997).
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broad political and ideological context of both. In doing so, it has
explained how the persistence, even the sharpening, of an
ideological clash of visions can be consistent with two develop-
ments among adherents to the polarized visions of law and
sovereignty: first, a growing flexibility and intramural disagree-
ment over specific laws and concrete governmental institutions,
and, second, an increasing attention to socially held rule-of-law
values and opinions on the issues of the day.
The account of Hong Kong's endgame, however, remains
incomplete. It does not yet fully address the significance of the
particular strategies the main parties to the political struggles used
in addressing and pursuing key social groups. Integrating that part
of the story fully into the analysis must await a more detailed
inquiry into the political battles over "the Hong Kong people"
and "the business community," a project we take up in Hong
Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (i). Still, at this point,
enough of the picture is visible to suggest how the notion of a
pre-1997 "endgame" can provide an analytic link between that
struggle over social groups and the matters examined in more
depth in this Article.
5. STRATEGIES FOR HONG KONG'S "ENDGAME"
Three concepts of an "endgame" suggest coherent ways of
understanding this seemingly arbitrary or paradoxical combination
of approaches to the legal and institutional issues that have
dominated the politics of Hong Kong's last pre-reversion years.
5.1. "Colloquial" Endgames
This period might be thought of as an endgame in the
colloquial sense, as typically used in journalistic accounts of
legislative or broader political negotiations over controversial
issues. The players realize that they face, in effect, a deadline
before which they must complete all deals. Where they perceive
feasible deals that are superior to the alternative of leaving matters
unresolved, the players will scramble to mobilize forces conducive
to the agreements they prefer and will try to craft bargaining
strategies that avoid both too-ready compromises (leading to less
favorable deals than might have been achieved) and excessive
"holding-out" (leading to a failure to reach deals that were worth
having). The "colloquial endgame" analysis assumes, at least
implicitly, a mechanism for deterring parties from reneging on
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such eleventh-hour deals, with costs to reputation, or judicial or
political enforcement being among the more obvious and common
examples.
For Hong Kong, July 1, 1997 is, of course, the deadline for
resolution of such issues as rights-protecting legislation, the
legislature, the highest court, and the selection of the highest
executive officer for the S.A.R. Unlike the fact of Hong Kong's
reversion or the existence and basic structure of the S.A.R. (which
had been hashed out in the 1980s), none of these matters was
firmly settled well in advance of 1997, leaving them all potentially
subject to the dynamics of an endgame in the colloquial sense.
Other essential aspects of an endgame, in this sense, were
present as well. The key political participants who might bargain
with respect to these issues quite plausibly perceived possible
outcomes that were superior to a "no deal" option. For the
colonial authorities and the territory's liberal and democratic
politicians, a number of conceivable resolutions doubtless seemed
better than letting the P.R.C. and the S.A.R. government address
them entirely on their own after 1997. Indeed, the P.R.C. and its
allies frequently used just that argument, raising the specter of
uncertainty and potentially unpalatable results that would attend
a failure to reach agreement, to press their negotiating partners
and Hong Kong audiences to accept otherwise unappealing
proposals.
For the P.R.C. and its allies too, the "no deal" option was
surely less appealing than some of the very favorable arrangements
in which the P.R.C. could reasonably expect the colonial
authorities and many Hong politicians to acquiesce. And, absent
a deal, a pre-announced, unilaterally imposed arrangement of the
sort that characterized the Provisional Legislature and Bill of
Rights issues was a plausible second-best solution, especially if
some degree of support in the territory could be obtained. As
many in the P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. camp appeared to realize, a
failure to reach an accord or to win acceptance of reasonably clear
arrangements before reversion, with attendant prospects of
unspecified unilateral resolution after July 1, 1997, could under-
mine the confidence in Hong Kong's future that Beijing wanted
to preserve.
As a "colloquial" endgame also requires, reneging on last-
minute promises after Hong Kong's reversion could plausibly
trigger sanctions that the same underlying behavior would not
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elicit in the absence of such undertakings. These ranged from the
highly juridical if rather implausible (appeals to the International
Court of Justice to enforce relevant provisions of the Joint
Declaration or to Hong Kong courts or authorized P.R.C. bodies
to enforce and apply relevant sections of the Basic Law or other
laws) to the conventionally political (reputational costs to the
P.R.C. in Hong Kong and globally, and the prospect of political
unrest in Hong Kong, on one side, and the costs to Hong Kong
liberals' claims to the moral and legal high-ground, and the
prospect of a political crackdown in Hong Kong, on the other).
Against this background, the battle over "the people" and "the
business community" looks like an endgame strategy in the
colloquial sense. In appealing to and pressuring those groups, the
participants in a highly political process have been scrambling to
mobilize a "blitz" of whatever pressure they can bring to bear to
make sure that the deals that do get done at the last minute track
as closely as possible the participants' ideological preferences.
That both sides in the political struggle to shape Hong Kong's
future laws and institutions would intensify efforts and diversify
their arguments in trying to build and deploy such socially-based
political pressure during the 1990s is, then, hardly remarkable.
That they would turn to such strategies (and especially to
"threats" and "bribes" alongside appeals to principle) makes sense
in the "now or never" atmosphere of an endgame, in the colloqui-
al sense.
The splits and shifts within the two blocks of political players
can fit this picture as well. The divisions that emerged between
Hong Kong's colonial authorities and the territory's pro-democra-
cy politicians on, for example, the Court of Final Appeal bill and
the Chief Executive selection process, and the variety of "pro-
P.R.C." approaches to handling Bill of Rights-related questions
and the legislative through train, among other issues, reflect
precisely the sort of close tactical choices that the endgame poses.
Where does an unappealing proposed resolution cross the line and
become worse than a "no-deal" option? At what point does
pressing for a more appealing deal impose a risk of foregoing a
resolution worth having that is greater than its likely benefits in
getting the other side to compromise toward the prospective
"hold-out's" preferred solution?
In a world of imperfect information, even those who share the
same ideological perspective or concrete goals may differ on such
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questions. Indeed, such differences in tactical judgment seem to
echo loudly in the increasingly testy exchanges between the
colonial government and the territory's most ardent democrats
during the middle 1990s. Avowals of support for the same ends
of government accountability and the rule of law coexisted with
charges from Hong Kong's democratic politicians that the British
authorities were duplicitous and had betrayed those goals, and
responses from colonial government officials that the democrats
were being unrealistic, provocative, and risked scuttling the best
deals that one could reasonably hope to achieve in pursuit of their
shared values.
The same dynamic seems to be reflected, at least obliquely, in
the P.R.C. side's shifts between more and less accommodating
stances toward reforms of civil liberties laws, electoral laws and
other matters, and in the sometimes-public entreaties from pro-
P.R.C. Hong Kong sources (and perhaps even the Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office) to central leaders to take a softer line on the
legal and institutional issues of the era. At different times and to
different members of this less-than-monolithic block, endorsing
flawed but popular expansions of the franchise and acquiescing in
some questionable changes to public order legislation could seem
to offer a relatively costless path to avoiding a rocky transition
and to obtaining concessions on other fronts, or it could seem to
declare negotiable issues of sovereignty and control on which the
P.R.C. need not, or could not, yield.
5.2. "Technical" Endgames
The final years of the political struggle over Hong Kong's
post-reversion legal and institutional order also could be construed
as an endgame in the more technical sense, as the term is used in
the rational choice and game theory literature. That is, the
players understand that they are in the final round of their
reiterative dealings and are no longer deterred from "defecting" or
"cheating" by the prospect that such behavior will make their
other pledges to perform less credible to other players, and, in
turn, make it more difficult (that is, more costly) for the defecting
party to make reliable, desirable deals later. In such a context, the
impediments to making any bargain escalate and the credibility of
any bargains nominally struck plummets.
For this concept to apply, the final iteration of bargaining over
Hong Kong's post-reversion future has to have been a long one,
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with the shadow of July 1, 1997 extending back over much of the
1990s. Such a reading of the period is not farfetched. 02 As we
have seen, both sides' discussions on many of the issues of the era,
most notably political and electoral reform and the establishment
of the Court of Final Appeal, assumed that the parties were
already in a final round of negotiations about the territory's
future, with little or no talk of trading off compromises on one
legal or institutional issue for gains on another, and few remarks
about the need to assure continuing cooperation among the parties
to ensure a smooth transition. Moreover, the major controversies
of the period unfolded simultaneously, with each having surfaced
by the early 1990s and all still a subject of conflict and a source of
uncertainty during the waning months of colonial rule. Such
patterns were a marked departure from Sino-British negotiations
during the 1980s that had operated under the understanding that
both sides should, and would need to, cooperate in the run-up to
1997 and that the Joint Declaration, Basic Law and lesser,
subconstitutional matters would be addressed sequentially.
At least if we focus narrowly on the immediate context of
Hong Kong, the notion that parties' incentives not to defect were
low after the beginning of the 1990s is quite plausible. Already
handing over much de facto authority to the territory's future
rulers, and within a few years of the formal end of colonial rule,
the United Kingdom arguably was already well on its way to not
even being present, much less "deterrable." Certain to be thrown
out of office, and expecting possibly crippling restrictions on their
political activities after 1997, liberal and democratic politicians in
Hong Kong also arguably faced few incentives to cooperate or
compromise and, accordingly, could make few credible promises
even if the P.R.C. proved willing to negotiate.
Certainly, many Chinese and pro-P.R.C. statements about the
colonial authorities and liberal politicians during the 1990s were
consistent with an endgame assumption about the poor possibili-
ties of bargaining. A colonial government painted as bent on
unilateral last-minute moves to weaken governmental authority,
create a hotbed for sedition, and damage fiscal health - all in
102 The factual issues about Hong Kong noted in the text aside, many
elaborations on the theory of reiterative games note that the prospect of a true
endgame can, in effect, "infect" earlier iterations of bargaining, thus spreading
the pathologies of the endgame back to preceding rounds.
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violation of prior understandings and agreements - was not the
fit or credible bargaining partner with which the P.R.C. had
earlier seen fit to negotiate elements of a smooth transition. And
the P.R.C.'s branding some of Legco's leading democrats as
"subversives" suggested that anything cooperative they said was no
longer to be believed, even though some of them had been
included in earlier rounds of bargaining, through appointment to
the Basic Law Drafting Committee or membership in a legislature
expected to ride the through train.10'
From the "liberal" or "pro-democracy" side's perspective, the
fact that Hong Kong soon would lose the "protection" of its
colonial status which (for all its flaws) had required the P.R.C. to
deal with Hong Kong at arm's length and through another
sovereign state, made any promises the P.R.C. might make not
credible. On this view, with Britain gone, local liberals silenced,
and the world likely not paying much attention, the P.R.C. would
be free after the endgame to rewrite any arrangements it disliked,
much as it had in two events that coincided with the beginning of
Hong Kong's endgame: the betrayal of domestic P.R.C. legality in
the suppression of the democracy movement at Tiananmen, and
the departures from the P.R.C.'s international legal promises of
the Joint Declaration that were effected through the Basic Law.
In such a context, the protracted debate and often-futile
negotiations over the legal and institutional issues of the era are
intelligible in terms of a simple endgame in the technical sense.
Most simply, it is certainly plausible to conclude that no real deal
was reached, and few if any promises contrary to inclination were
made. The rules for the 1995 elections and the enactment of the
Bill of Rights and other legislative changes effective before 1997
were, at base, the unilateral acts of the colonial authorities. The
103 China's position on the "through train" was, of course, that the Legco
elected in 1995 was unacceptable. But some of the members of that body,
including Martin Lee, had also served on the 1991-selected Legco, which had
clearly been selected in a manner compatible with the degree of democratiza-
tion permitted under the through train model. And they, or others of their
ilk, certainly could have been expected to obtain seats on a 1995 Legco selected
in conformity with China's reading of the relevant legal framework. Indeed,
several of the Legco members most troubling to the P.R.C. represented some
of the twenty geographical constituencies to which the P.R.C. and its allies
made no objection in their attack on the Patten reforms, and the universal
suffrage election methods for those seats were compatible with the legal
conditions for the "through train" that the P.R.C. had prescribed.
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questions of the Provisional Legislature, the Chief Executive, and
the fate of the Bill of Rights were settled just as unilaterally by the
P.R.C. and on the P.R.C.'s terms, subject only to whatever
constraints prudential considerations suggested. An essentially
"imposed" Court deal to which the British acquiesced was little
different. And many participants and observers consider the
limited promises that the P.R.C. did make in each of these areas
to be of less-than-certain efficacy after July 1, 1997.
The struggles over the people and the business community
similarly make sense as strategies for an endgame in the technical
sense. In seeking to energize or persuade the social groups who
hold the keys to Hong Kong's continued success, the principal
participants in the political process have been trying to create
substitutes for the agreements and promises that are impossible to
reach or impossible to take seriously. That is, they have been
trying to assure that Hong Kong's post-reversion political
landscape will constrain, or permit, the territory's future rulers to
behave in ways that track what their preferred political "deal"
would have required. For both the "pro-P.R.C." side and the
"liberal" or "democratic" side, finding or fabricating support in
important Hong Kong communities for preferred resolutions to
the specific legal and institutional questions of the era - and for
compatible orientations toward the rule of law more generally -
has become an imperative to be pursued by whatever means
available, and often quite apart from any process of negotiation
between the key participants in the more narrow political process.
The diversity and instability of social-group-targeting strategies
may fit the picture of a technical endgame as well. Ideological
purity and an intransigent insistence on preferred outcomes may
be, at worst, costless since they do not put at risk any worthwhile
deals that could be made and relied upon. Moreover, adopting
such a stance might seem more promising as a mechanism for
creating the post-endgame social and political pressure on which
success in achieving preferred outcomes depends in the context of
a "technical" endgame. That is, presenting a simple and uncom-
promising version of one's own position, or that of one's
opponents, could be the most effective means to inspire, or
frighten, the relevant audience about what a future approximating
a "liberal or democratic" agenda or a "pro-P.R.C." alternative
might bring.
On the other hand, a more accommodating and moderate-
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sounding perspective might seem less likely to alienate or to scare
off key communities who have tended to see their interests being
served reasonably well by continuity and stability. Such a tactic
at least would seem worth trying, for it could always be aban-
doned simply by failing to honor promises that in retrospect
appeared unwise. Alternatively, a more flexible and compromis-
ing approach might make it possible to reach nominal resolutions
that would be worthwhile despite the problems of defection
inherent in an endgame. Even if neither side can do much to
make a bargain relatively invulnerable to reneging immediately
after July 1, 1997, the mere fact of a deal or a promise can create
popular pressure and elite expectations in Hong Kong that its
terms be honored or accepted. And to the extent that an
agreement can be partially implemented before the reversion, it
can acquire a degree of tangible, institutional momentum that is
not lightly reversed despite the absence of an ongoing relationship
between the parties and the lack of the conventional non-endgame
incentives not to defect from the deal or promise per se.
Like the tactical questions of the "colloquial endgame," these
too are matters on which judgment might vary over time and
among adherents to the same normative perspective and support-
ers of the same general resolution of the legal and institutional
issues of the endgame. It is plausible to see reflections of the
former view in the approaches that the territory's most strident
"liberal" or "pro-democracy" politicians took, for example, in
denouncing the Court of Final Appeal accords as a betrayal of
legality and democracy or in calling for democratization far more
rapid than the Patten plan contemplated. The same sort of
assessment could explain some of the more "hard-line" positions
in the pro-P.R.C. side's perspective, such as out-of-hand dismissals
of civil liberties legislation as unacceptable and dangerous, and
sweeping assertions of the P.R.C. and S.A.R. governments' wide
discretion in establishing laws and institutions for post-1997 Hong
Kong. The latter view, in contrast, seems more in step with the
methods adopted by the colonial authorities in accepting the court
deals (especially the 1991 arrangement which might have permit-
ted the C.F.A. to be set up in 1993), and the Chief Executive
selection process. It may also explain the decision to press only
for a modest degree of democratization for the 1995 elections,
under a set of rules that could be defended as compatible with the
P.R.C.-established conditions for a through train and that, once in
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place, could be expected to command broad popular support. The
same perspective may also help to make sense of the more
moderate aspects of the arguments pursued by the P.R.C. and its
allies in the territory, including those that pledged substantial
continuity in some civil liberties-protecting laws and a system
permitting a considerable degree of electoral democracy. Some-
times quite explicitly, proponents of such positions presented
them as prudent, perhaps shrewdly preemptive, tactics for dealing
with Hong Kong preferences that would surely persist beyond
reversion and have to be addressed then.
5.3. The End of the Game, Not the End of the Games
Finally, pre-reversion Hong Kong's endgame can be analyzed
as the end of "a game," but not the end of a series of "games" for
key participants in the political struggle to shape the territory's
laws and institutions. That is, when the "game" - the particular
set of related, reiterative interactions among a stable set of players
- comes to an end, the players do not disappear from one
another's worlds. They may continue to interact but in a new
"game" where they may play different roles, under different rules,
and with different assets. In such a context, the players approach-
ing the end of the initial game may face extremely complex
choices, with, for example, the low costs of "defecting" being
much less certain than in a true endgame in the technical sense,
and the demarcation between "pre-deadline" and "post-deadline"
deals being much less sharp than in a true endgame in the
colloquial sense.
Although not as analytically crisp, this conception has
empirical appeal. In Hong Kong, most of the.major participants
are likely to remain in the picture beyond 1997, but on very
different terms. The P.R.C. will become a more dominant force
in Hong Kong once Britain has withdrawn, the colonial govern-
ment has been abolished, and the current Legco has been dis-
solved. Although, at last, the territory's effective sovereign, the
P.R.C. is not likely to be the only player in what promises to be
an ongoing process of shaping S.A.R. laws and institutions. A
local government and pro-P.R.C. organizations are not likely
suddenly to become completely indistinguishable from the central
Chinese authorities in a Chinese state that seems ever more
fragmented. Also, it is by no means certain that the leading
Democrats and like-minded independents will be permanently
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silenced or marginalized. In addition, some people with broadly
liberal and legalist sympathies hold some of the most important
posts in the through-train-riding executive branch. Even the U.K.
leadership has insisted that its obligations to Hong Kong extend
beyond 1997 and that it will continue to exert whatever interna-
tional pressure it can to enforce the agreements and principles that
it believes apply.
From this perspective, the political battles over "business" and
"the people" are in part about pressuring participants in the
political process to make favorable deals before the July 1, 1997
deadline, and in part about building constituencies to press for
desired solutions in the absence of any effective pre-reversion deal.
But they are also about cultivating and accumulating assets for the
next "game." Much of what both sides have done in the political
struggle over social groups seems to make sense on these terms.
Such an account, for example, suggests that it was coherent and
rational for some of Hong Kong's most prominent democrats to
continue to campaign for popular and business support for their
positions on rule-of-law issues despite a belief that no meaningful
deal with the P.R.C. was possible in advance of the 1997 deadline,
and despite pessimism about the likelihood of business leaders or
the people pressing the liberal agenda immediately after reversion.
Conversely, the pursuit of the same sort of asset-cultivation
strategy could provide one explanation of the P.R.C.'s sometimes
provocative and sometimes embarrassingly unsuccessful attempts
to foster pro-P.R.C. views and build a cadre of pro-P.R.C. organs
and loyalists, both among the masses and among the territory's
business elites, even though such groups seemed relatively
ineffectual before the handback, and arguably superfluous
afterwards.
A notion of an ending game, but with continuing games, also
provides another way of making sense of the major political
participants' interactions on the eve of reversion. For example, if
reputational concerns matter more than in a pure endgame in the
technical sense and making a deal matters less than in a pure
endgame in the colloquial sense, then the P.R.C. and its allies
were understandably willing to press for resolutions of major legal
and institutional issues before July 1, but remained reluctant to
strike deals or make promises that were relatively unpalatable.
Not wanting to bear the costs to credibility and confidence that
a failure to perform would bring and reasonably confident that
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adequate and affordable resolutions might still be crafted after
reversion, the P.R.C. was understandably willing to be fairly, but
not completely, intransigent. Similarly, Hong Kong's pro-democ-
racy leaders and activists, on this view, had perhaps equally
comprehensible reasons to seek genuine solutions on key issues,
but not to compromise very much: analogous reputational
concerns (absent from the simplest version of the true technical
endgame) dissuaded them from imperiling, through compromise
or defection, the claim to the moral high ground that was perhaps
their principal reversion-surviving asset; so too did a plausible
belief (less tenable in the true colloquial endgame) that they might
be able, despite their initially weakened condition, ultimately to
negotiate post-reversion resolutions of key legal and institutional
issues that were preferable to what the P.R.C. was offering at the
endgame. Perhaps tellingly, this notion of an endgame within an
on-going and changing series of games works least well in
explaining the behavior of the British authorities, the one
heretofore principal participant who would not play a major role
in post-1997 "games."
All three of these notions of an endgame fit the evidence from
contemporary Hong Kong reasonably well; none fits perfectly.
Each may well capture some facets of a reality too complex to be
reduced to a single model. On the eve of July 1, 1997 choosing
among them, or rejecting all three, is at best a speculative
enterprise. For now, at least, their utility likely lies in the light
they collectively shed on contemporary Hong Kong's patterns of
purity and pragmatism: they provide frameworks for understand-
ing how the clash between principled but partially indeterminate
visions of domestic law and sovereignty plays out in the practical
politics of shaping specific laws and concrete institutions in a
context where the key participants accept that the views and
values of ordinary citizens, business elites, and others matter.
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